AN
Impartial Enquiry
INTO THE
Duke of *ORMONDE*'s
CONDUCT,
IN THE
Campagne of 1712.

WITH

A Plan of the Situation of the *Confederate* and *French* Armies when the Duke refus'd to Fight, as it was drawn on the Spot by General *C——n*; and Remarks made thereon by Mr. *Maynwaring*.

LONDON,

Printed for *J. Roberts*, near the *Oxford-Arms* in *Warwick-Lane*. MDCCXV. Price One Shilling.

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

A PROSPECT of the CONFEDERATE & FRENCH Armyes as they Lay y^e 30 of May 1712. when PRINCE EUGENE was for Fighting.


HANAULT
CAMBRESIS
CARDIE
ANCE
Many
le Warde
Erchin
Monchicour
Mastaing
Villers au Tertre
Marquette
Marque
Bouchain
Fressaing
Wavrechin
Vasne au Bacq
Beugnicour
Fechain
Crupilly
Paillecourt
Estrun
Ham
Fressies
Vergier
Espinoy
Cuvellie
Abancour
Bantigny
Thun l'Eveque
Haynecourt
Blecourt
Sancourt
Escaut R.
Herlingue
S. Ole
Bourlon
Mares
Fontaine N.D.
Cantin
Cambray
Cantigneul
Prouville
Niergny
Noyele
Marcoin
Maisnieres
Lesdain
Esnes
Wittemins
Crevecour
Villars
Vauchelles
Honnencour
Vendoville
Villers quitain
Le Castelet
Beaurevoir
le Mont S. Martin
Bellicour
Source de l'Escaut
Aubechou
Govy
Villers
Matincour
Serain
Ellincour
Premont
Brancour
Monbrehain
Bohain
Rosteule
Jennechies
Mauroir
Maraiz
Malmaison
Savigny
Caulery
Haucourt
Longsart
Ligny
Tronequoy
Categnieres
Diambas
Rumilly
Etourmel
Caudry
Fresnoy
Cauroy
Boussieres
Cargnieres
Caignoncle
Nave
Escaudoeuvre
Rieu
Villers Cauchies
Avesne le Secq
Hordaing
Juvy
Thun S. Martin
Lieu S. Amand
Neufville
Noyelle
Douchy
Hauchin
Herchin
Flory
Haspre
Selle R.
Prince Eugen's Army
Saulsoy
Montrecour
Haussy
S. Piton
Solem
S. Aubert
S. Hilaire
S. Vast
Quicuy
Clermont
Vies
Betencour
Beaumont
Audencour
Remboulieu
Bertines
Montigny
Trois villes
Inchy
Montay
Chasteau Cambresis
Briate
Neuvelis
S. Belin
S. Crespin
S. Souplet
S. Martin
Becquignies
Molain
Vaux en Arouaise
Busigny
Hannechy
The Duke of Ormond's Army

THE

Duke of *ORMONDE*'s CONDUCT

EXAMIN'D.

NOTHING in the World could have given the *People* of *England* more Satisfaction, than to ſee a clear Vindication of his *Grace* the Duke of *Ormonde*'s Conduct, with reſpect to the Share he had in the late *Adminiſtration*: For I can by no Means look on the *Campaign* of 1712 to be the only, though it is the chief Ground of their Complaint. I could have wiſh'd that ſome noble *Pen* would have undertaken ſo difficult and glorious a Task, which I hear was the Work of a double *Proſtitute*, the *She*-Author of the *Atalantis*, whoſe *Pen* and *Perſon* are equally *Common* and *Mercenary*, and fit only for the Service of ſuch a *Cauſe* as that of the late *Miniſters*.

I wondered to hear that ſuch Sacred Things as *Royal Orders* and *Inſtructions*, *State-Letters*, &c. ſhould be truſted to the Mananagement of ſuch a *Trafficker* in *Lewdneſs* and *Scandal*. Any Thing that comes from Hands like hers muſt be tainted by them; and it is Pity no Writer of a better Character would attempt to juſtifie his Grace's *Conduct*. It had been more advantageous to it not to have had any Juſtification at all, than to have depended on the Ability or Honeſty of ſo vile a *Romancer*. There is not a good Man or Woman in *England* but was ſcandalized at the *Falſities* and *Invectives* which made her four *Romances* ſo acceptable to *wanton* and *factious* Readers, and

to ſee how the diſſaffected *Party* admire and carreſs her, even for that very wicked Performance, is a lively Inſtance of their *Morals* and *Merits*. 'Twas neceſſary to premiſe thus much of the *Manager* of the late Pamphlet called, the *Conduct of the Duke of* Ormonde, that People might not be impoſed upon to think the Rank of the *Author* was equal to that of his *Grace*.

I muſt beg Leave, in looking into the Subject of the *New Conduct*, to go a little back and examine what Agreement there is between the Management of the Military Affairs abroad in 1712, and ſome Events in Civil Ones at Home; and we ſhall find that in all *Debates* and *Diſſentions*, where *Revolution Principles* have been in Queſtion, the Heroe of this Treatiſe has ſignalized himſelf on the Side of the *Cavaliers*, that he particularly was very zealous for *Sacheverell*, and in almoſt every Debate that reflected on the Honour and Capacity of the *Old Miniſters*; which doubtleſs made their Succeſſors very ſure of him, or they would not have truſted him with an *Army*.

Can one imagine that after the Duke of *Marlborough* had done ſo many great Things in the Service of his *Queen* and *Country*, after he had juſtly acquired the Reputation of the greateſt *General* in the World, that any other Commander would venture to take on him this high Poſt with an Intention to act in it with the ſame Vigour and Sincerity? What Hopes were there for any one who had not a *Superiour* Genius to continue the *War* with the ſame *Glory*? The very Rumour of *Change* in the *Command* of the *Army* was enough to occaſion a *Change* in the *Fortune* of it. *Valour* alone will never form an accompliſh'd *General*, and even *Magnificence* is of little Uſe in a *Council* of *War*. There hardly is one Example in all *Hiſtory* of a Nation, who in the midſt of *Victory* diſplaced the *Conquerour*, but *Shame* and *Ruin* were the Effects of it, and the Succeſſors of the victorious *Chief* ſerve only for Inſtances of the *Misfortunes* and *Diſgraces* of unequal *Rivals*. This is ſufficient to make one conclude, That the *New General* was not unacquainted with the *New Meaſures*. *More* had been in *France* to make a Peace: Good God! Who would have gone to have ſupported in the Field the Negotiations of *Arthur More*? What a Bleſſed Peace muſt

that

that be which ſuch a Creature was employed in? And what a fine Commiſſion for a Heroe to be the Defender of ſuch a Man's Councils and Intrigues? One cannot doubt but that the Succeſſors of the Duke of *Marlborough* knew who had been ſent to *France*, and what they had done there: That the *Preliminaries* were agreed upon, and the *Peace* as good as ſigned: That afterwards there could not conſequently be one Step taken againſt *France* in the War but muſt put that Peace backward, which the Miniſters were driving on with unaccountable Raſhneſs and Haſte; and that whatever was ſaid of continuing the War, of acting *in concert* with the *Allies*, and the like, was all Grimace to amuſe them; for theſe Miniſters had already broken their Faith by acting with *France without Concert*, contrary to the Tenor of the *Grand Alliance*, and indeed all Treaties of Confederacy. Upon this Foot let us ſee what is ſaid in this *Woman's Vindication* of her *Patron*, and then we ſhall be able to judge whether we take ſuch a Commiſſion to conſiſt with the Intereſt of our *Country*, or the Character of our *General*. For if he knew what the Miniſters were doing in *France*, he muſt of courſe know what they would have done in *Flanders*; and if he knew nothing of either, I leave it to the World to judge upon what Foot he took, and the Miniſters gave that Commiſſion. The *Inſtructions* bear Date the 7th of *April* 1712, ſix Months after *More* had been in *France*, and *Meſnager* in *England*, and in it is this Expreſſion, *You are to expreſs to the Penſionary the Reſolutions we are in of puſhing the War with all poſſible Vigour*. This looks very fair and promiſing, but the next Words ſpoil all, *Until the Enemy ſhall agree to ſuch Terms of Peace as may be ſafe aud honourable for us and our Allies*. The *Terms* were known to every one; nay, the *Terms* thus talk'd of, and ſign'd by *Meſnager* were much better than the *Treaty* of *Utrecht*. The Houſe of Lords voted them to be *diſhonourable*; all the *Allies* cry'd out againſt them, the *Proteſtant Succeſſion* repreſented the Danger of them; and therefore there was no doubt but the Enemy would agree to ſuch a Peace as ſoon as we had done what we could to oblige the reſt of the Confederates to come into it, by abandoning them to the Power of *France*, which ſeems to be the main Drift of the Miniſters in the Cam-

pagne

paign of 1712: The reſt of the Inſtructions is, *to meet Prince* Eugene, *review the Regiments, and write to St.* John. I cannot help obſerving, that it is inſinuated as if Mr. *Cadogan* courted to ſerve in the Campagne of 1712, either to do Honour to the *General*, or himſelf, whereas in Truth it was to be what the *Conduct* ſays, *A Witneſs to all his Actions*; and that General can very well witneſs how ingeniouſly the Advantage of beating the *French* was loſt; he having taken an exact Plan of the Situation of both Armies in their ſeveral Camps in the Month of *May*, when the Prince of *Savoy* earneſtly entreated the *Engliſh* General to join with him in giving the *French* Battle. It is ſaid in this Pamphlet, that *the* Engliſh *Troops were better cloathed and recruited than the* Dutch, *and that they were earlier in the Field than the Imperialiſts*, but the *Dutch* were ready and eager to fight in their old Cloaths, and the *Germans* came up Time enough to beat the *French*. Great Complaint is made alſo in the Beginning of the Book of the Backwardneſs of Prince *Eugene* to *open the Campagne*; one may very well conclude it was not ſo much to ſee the *Iſſue of the Negotiations at* Utrecht, as is hinted, as to find out, if poſſible, what Dependance was to be made on the *Britiſh Troops*, and what *Orders* the General had as to the *Operations* of it. For the Sincerity of our Miniſters as to the carrying on the War was ſuſpected long before the Duke of *Ormond* left *England:* And I don't believe there was a Coffee-Houſe Politician in *London* but made a Jeſt of it when the Duke of *Marlborough* had not the Command; and indeed the very firſt Letter which *St. John* wrote the Duke ſhews plainly, that the Houſe of *Auſtria* was not be conſidered in the above-mentioned Negotiations, but a Peace to be all in Favour of *France* which made fighting as Criminal as running away would have been at *Ramillies*. *A Battle won*, ſays the Secretary, *might give Ground for inſiſting on higher Terms than the Houſe of* Auſtria *was now likely to obtain*; *a Battle loſt might ſtill continue to prolong the War*. Whenever the Strength or Weakneſs of the Houſe of *Auſtria* is ſpoken of by the late Managers, 'tis *all Pretence*; ſometimes they tremble at their *Power*, ſometimes they laugh at their *Impotence*. Here *St. John* is not afraid leaſt the Houſe of *Auſtria* ſhould gain, but leaſt the Houſe of *Bourbon* ſhould loſe

too

too much, and in this Senſe he and his Brethren are always to be underſtood. In the next Letter of our good Secretaries, we ſhall find how this Farce was carry'd on ſtill, the General *muſt be cautious for ſome time of engaging in any Action*; becauſe the *German* Troops were not come up, and it was *juſt they ſhould have their part* if any Action happen'd. What follows is extreamly merry, *The great Article of preventing the Union of* France *and* Spain *is not yet entirely ſettled, the Expedients are hard of Digeſtion to the* French *Monarch.* I don't think there is any thing ſo abſurd and ridiculous in all Story. The Council of Senators in *Venice preſerv'd*, could not be Guilty of any thing more Fooliſh and Impertinent, and yet no leſs than our own Religion and Liberties, but the Religion of all the Proteſtants, and the Liberties of them, and all *Europe* depended on the Conduct of this hopeful Miniſtry. *The Union of the two Kingdoms is not yet entirely ſettled*; Oh! but it was wonderfully well ſettled afterwards. How! by two *Renunciations only*, *Expedients very hard of Digeſtion to the* French *Monarch*; who by his Treaty of *Marriage*, the *Pyrenean* Treaty, by his Oath and Declarations, had as ſolemnly renounced all Claim to the *Spaniſh* Monarchy for himſelf, and his Heirs with as much Solemnity and Sincerity as ever this pious Secretary renounced the *Pretender*. The Duke in his Anſwer to this Letter acknowledges, that if *a fair Opportunity happen'd to Attack the Enemy he could not decline, if prevail'd on by Prince* Eugene: Unleſs, what? unleſs he *receiv'd a Meſſenger from Mr.* Secretary. And his Grace in a ſecond Letter added, *If there were a good Opportunity to Attack the Enemy, and get into* France *by the way of* Champagne, *he was ſure the Prince and States would preſs it:* In the ſame Letter he is pleas'd to ſay, ſpeaking of the Peace, *he wiſh'd it very heartily*, and when one wiſhes ſo heartily for a thing, to which one knows one can contribute the moſt of any Body, 'tis ten to one but one has it. And in the next Letter from St. *John*, *There comes a poſitive Command, that he ſhould avoid engaging in any Seige, or hazarding a Battle.* And why, attend ye *Britons*, and all you who have common Senſe hearken to the important Reaſon, becauſe there was Reaſon to believe we ſhould at laſt prevail on the *French* King, to add a new *Renunciation* to twenty old Ones; for

is there more or leſs in the meaning of theſe Words. *Since Her Majeſty had Reaſon to believe, that ſhe ſhould come to an Agreement upon the grand Article of preventing the Ruin of the two Monarchies.* Here comes the honourable Part that the General was to act; *She——would have you diſguiſe the Precept of this Order, and not own that which might at preſent have an ill Effect if 'twas publickly known.* Let us all along bear in Mind, that we were oblig'd not to ſtir a Step in Peace or War, but in concert with our Allies, when the Intereſts of the grand Alliance were in queſtion. Here's a Scene, and by whom is it open'd? This upon my Word is Frankneſs with a Vengeance. *Her Majeſty*, continues this Honeſt-hearted Secretary, *will not ſuffer her ſelf to be expos'd to the Reproach of having Retarded, by the Events of a Campagne, a Negotiation, which might have been as good as concluded in a few Days*; who, for God's ſake, was there to Reproach her Majeſty, all the Allies abhorr'd the Conditions of this Negotiation, which truly this Secretary and his Brethren had as good as concluded many Months before: All the Proteſtants in *Europe* were troubled at it, all the honeſt and wiſe Men of her own Subjects deteſted the Negotiation and Negotiators; and who then could Reproach her Majeſty for carrying on the War that Campagne, but the *French* King, the common Enemy; it is impoſſible to read ſuch Stuff and have Patience. Tho' not a Word of this was to be ſaid to any Generals or Miniſters of the Allies, who were moſt concerned in it; yet the Court of *France* was quickly made eaſy, and all their Fears put an end to. *This Order*, ſays the Secretary, *is communicated at the ſame time to the Court of* France; ſo that *if the Mareſchal de* Villars *ſhould take any private Notice of it, the Duke is to anſwer accordingly.* Let us compare this with the Words of the *Inſtruction*, and ſee what immortal Honour all thoſe that had any Hand in this Buſineſs deſerve; *You are to meet with the Prince* Eugene, *and ſuch others of the Generals as ſhall be on the Secret, and with them to concert the proper Meaſures for entering in Action*; that is to ſay, you are the 7th of *April* to be in the Secret with the Confederate Generals, and about a Fortnight afterwards you are to be in the Secret alſo with the General of their Enemy. No! This is not to be paralell'd in all the *Hiſtories* that

ever

ever were written, *Fides Punica*, *Fides Gallica*, *Punick Faith*, *French Faith*, are nothing to this; there are a hundred Thouſand Men in the Field, whoſe Lives depend on the Wiſdom and Integrity of their *Generals*; there are half the Nations in *Europe*, whoſe ſafety depends alſo on the *Honeſty* of the *Confederates*. Here is an Inſtance of it; could one think that the *new General* would ever have receiv'd another Letter from a Man, who durſt write to him in ſuch a manner? Well, let that go: We are in the next place inform'd, that far from being ſhockt at ſuch Orders, and having an Abhorrence for ſuch double-dealing; the Duke would, *if he could, have made uſe of ſome pretence to delay the March of the Confederate Army*, pag. 9. And again, *He uſed all his endeavours to prevent a Suſpicion, that he had receiv'd the above-mention'd Orders.* Is this *puſhing the War with Vigour*, this acting like Men of Honour with thoſe that had put Confidence in us? The *Germans*, whom we heard of before, as very lazy in their March; and the *Dutch* who had no *new Cloaths, now preſs vehemently for a Siege, if to fight the Enemy was found improper.* The Author owns, pag. 10. *There was ſcarce any Excuſe left him for delay*; but he ſhall ſoon have one, for a Letter comes immediately from the Mareſchal *de Villars*, wherein he ſays, *He has Orders from his Maſter, with the Conſent of the Queen, to acquaint him, that they were no longer Enemies.* The *Treaty* at *Utretcht* was not concluded, and it was in *England* term'd *Faction* and *Sedition*, to ſay it would be a *ſeparate One*; but the *French* Mareſchal knew more than any of us, and to prevent the Secret's ſpreading, the *French* King's General was order'd to *keep this Matter with an inviolable Secrecy.* The Duke of *Ormond*, in Anſwer to this, lets the Mareſchal know, that however in Appearance he might ſeem to march againſt him; *He need not be in any Apprehenſions on that Account, at leaſt the Duke would anſwer for the Army, which he had the Honour to Command.*

We come now to the Diſcovery of this fatal Secret, which the *Engliſh* General was fore'd to make to excuſe his refuſing to fight the *French*, when there was the faireſt Opportunity of ruining their Army that ever the *Confederates* had in the Courſe of the *War.* The Duke confeſſes, that the *General* Officers, and

the *Quarter Maſters* who had been to view the *French* Camp declar'd, the Attacking of them to be moſt practicable.

Prince *Eugene* had ſent General *Felz* to *Reconnetre* the Situation of the *French* Army, and view the Ground for Attacking them. The Duke of *Ormond* agreed to the ſending this Detachment, and upon the Report that was made by the Imperial General *Felz*, *That the open Country between the Spring Head of the* Schelde, *and the* Somme *was large enough for twenty Squadrons to march a Breaſt*. The Prince made the neceſſary Diſpoſitions to Attack the Enemy, and communicated his Deſign to the *Britiſh* General, who finding the Opportunity ſo favourable, that there could be no Excuſe for not Fighting, which would oblige him to diſcover his ſecret Inſtructions before Matters were ripe, ſent out a truſty Officer, General *Withers* to *Reconnetre* the Ground too on the very Appearance of *Wither*'s Detachment, the *French* made Preparations to fly behind the *Somme*, but they were more afraid than hurt. The Duke's Officer was ſent doubtleſs to bring back a Report very different from General *Felz*'s, that there was no *Attacking the Enemy by reaſon of ſome Defiles and uneven Grounds, on which they were advantageouſly Poſted. This Report*, ſays the Author of the Hiſtory of the Treaty of *Utrecht*, pag. 293. *furniſh'd the Duke of* Ormond *with plauſible Objections againſt Prince* Eugene's *Propoſals; but the ſame being fully anſwer'd, and the Duke being preſt by his Highneſs and the Field Deputies of the States, he at laſt declared*, That he had receiv'd poſitive Orders by a Courier from the Queen not to agree to a Battle; *Hereupon his Highneſs without ſhewing the leaſt ſurprize at ſuch a Declaration, which 'twas ſaid was not altogether unexpected, anſwer'd*, 'Twas no great matter, nor would ſuch Orders hinder the Succeſſes of this Campagne, ſince they might undertake the Sieges both of *Queſnoy* and *Landrecy*, and after the Conqueſt of thoſe two Places penetrate as far as *Paris*. His *Highneſſes*'s Judgment juſtifies that of the *Whigs* in *England*, which the Faction endeavour'd to ridicule as Viſionary and Chimærical, whereas the Confederates never having had ſuch an opportunity to fall upon the *French* with Advantage, and the gaining of a Battle would infallibly have gain'd *Queſnoy*, *Landrecy*, *Peronne*, and all the Towns to the *Somme*, where would

would have been the Difficulty of marching through a defenceleſs Country to *Paris*, and driving the Monarch, who now inſults us with a new *Dunkirk*, out of *Verſailles*. Prince *Eugene* ſaid in another Conference on the ſame Subject, *I am in no Paſſion, but I do aſſure you I never promis'd my ſelf more from a day of Battle than I did from this.* The Superiority and Goodneſs of the Troops are allow'd of in the *Conduct*, and even the fair opportunity to make uſe of them; yet the General, who at the *Hague*, upon his firſt Arrival in *Holland* this Year, told the *Dutch* Miniſters, *Great Britain would continue the War with Vigour, 'till the Enemy was brought to ſuch Terms as might render the Peace Laſting and Honourable*; now declares, *That his Orders forbid him to enter into any Action againſt the Enemy either by Battle or Siege.* I will not enter into the diſpute, how far Miniſters and Generals are warranted by Orders to do unwarrantable things; but this, I dare ſay, that if Orders are ſufficient to skreen them from being call'd to Account, it is impoſſible for an ill Miniſter ever to be puniſh'd. Such Men, if they had not entire Poſſeſſion of their Sovereign, could never get into the Miniſtry; and when once they are got into it, how eaſy is it for them to procure Orders for things of which they are themſelves the Adviſers. And whoever will read the Debates in Parliament upon the Impeachment of the Earl of *Clarendon*, will ſee what my Lord Chief Juſtice *Vaughan*, the greateſt Lawyer in *England*, ſaid on this Subject. Mr. *Prynne* would have excus'd the Earl for the Article of ſelling *Dunkirk*; becauſe, ſaid he, *It was by the King's Conſent.* The Lord *Vaughan*, then a Member of the Houſe of *Commons*, reply'd, *The King's Conſent was no Plea for the doing an evil Action, and both the Adviſer and the Agent are ſtill accountable.* His own Words are a little too hard, he makes it Treaſon notwithſtanding the Kings *Conſent*, another Word for *Orders*, but I own I am no Lawyer, and therefore I chuſe leſſer Terms. My above-mention'd Author ſpeaking of Prince *Eugene*'s Conference with the Duke, when he diſcover'd the Orders he had not to give Battle, or Beſiege a Town, adds; "All that Prince *Eugene* could ſay to him upon the favourable "opportunity they now had put into their Hands of gaining "a Victory over the Enemy, and forcing them by that means

to agree to a good Peace with all the Confederates, was in vain, though his Highneſs added, *that the Confederate Army paſt the* Schelde, *and advanc'd into the middle of the Enemies Garriſons, they cou'd not now retire without the hazard of receiving a Blow, and that it wou'd have been better ſince it was ſo that the Duke had diſcover'd his Orders before they had approached ſo near the Enemies Army.* No doubt of it, but that wou'd not have anſwer'd the Ends of the Miniſtry, which was to diſtreſs the Allies by deſerting them when they had moſt occaſion of the aſſiſtance of the *Britiſh* Troops. I have ſaid already that I will not diſpute about the validity or invalidity of Orders as to juſtifying a General's Conduct; however I cannot help remarking, that to accept of a Commiſſion, where the firſt inſtruction ſhall look ſo promiſing, the ſecond ſo ſhocking, to be oblig'd to blow hot and cold at the will of a corrupt Miniſtry, to be upbraided with betraying a Confederacy, and to have nothing to ſay for ones ſelf but *Here are my Orders*, is a Station which at beſt deſerves pity, tho' when the conſequences of a profound obedience to theſe Orders prove very fatal, that Paſſion generally turns to its contrary. The Crime or the weakneſs is in accepting of ſuch Orders, in protecting Miniſters that procur'd them, and careſſing and cajoling the Faction by whoſe Mutinies and Clamours that Miniſtry uſurpt their Power. This is perſiſting in the error, and far from extenuating the guilt of it, ſhews the *Heart* as well as the *Hand* to be engag'd in the execution of them.

The late Managers cannot pretend Ignorance in this Affair, they were ſufficiently told of the ill conſequence of their deſerting the Confederates in the Campagne of 1712, both within Doors and without. The whole Nation was alarm'd at the news of the Duke of *Ormond*'s refuſing to fight the *French*. There was not an honeſt thinking Man but ſaw we were betrayed; the Managers had a *major Vote* which wou'd carry them through any thing. They were ſenſible they had no other ſupport than that packt Majority, and were reſolv'd to do their Buſineſs with it. It was a melancholy condition the poor *Britons* were in to know they were leading to Deſtruction, and had none to help them; their Friends already were in as bad Circumſtances as themſelves, their Victorious Army had *Orders* to be Friends with the

the *French*, their Victorious General cou'd do nothing for them: yet their true *Patriots* cou'd not see all this Ruin coming upon them without bearing their Testimony against it. The Lord *Halifax* in an Eloquent Speech, having taken notice of the *strange Declaration of the Duke of* Ormond *that he had no Orders to act Offensively against the Enemy*; set forth *the necessity of carrying on the War with the utmost Vigour in order to obtain a safe and Honourable Peace.* The same Day Mr. *Poultney* made a motion in the House of Commons for an Address to acquaint Her Majesty, *that Her Faithful Commons are justly alarm'd at the Intelligences receiv'd from abroad that Her General in* Flanders *has declined to act Offensively against* France *in Concurrence with Her Allies*; *and being under the Deepest Concern for the dangerous Consequences which must arise from hence to the Common Cause, they did with all Humility beseech Her Majesty that speedy Instructions may be given to Her General in* Flanders, *to prosecute the War with the utmost Vigour, in Conjunction with Her Allies, as the best means to obtain a safe and Honourable Peace, and to quiet the Minds of her People, who cannot but be extreamly apprehensive of the fatal consequence of such a Division.* There was no Orders that this Motion shou'd pass in the *affirmative.* The worthy *Mover* of it despaired of carrying it in such a House as that was, compos'd of *Tackers* and *Addressers.* But the intent of it was to let the People see how they were us'd in the *Field* as well as in the *Cabinet*, and take off all pretence from the late Ministers that they did not act against light, so that being the best Plea they cou'd have for this Male-administration; and when Prince *Eugene* and the Deputies of the States received this *strange Declaration* of the Duke of *Ormond*, as has been observ'd already, to which I shall only add; this Prince told the Deputies, *He expected other Orders in a few Days*, as we find in the States Letter to the Queen. Did the Duke expect Orders to fight Mareschal *Villars* after the Complements and Assurances that had past between them? Did he think *St. John* who sent *Moore* to *France* wou'd ever send him Orders to undo all that had been done there by a Battle? Was not this expression to amuse the Allies, for what other Orders cou'd come from the then Ministers, but to desert them and withdraw the *British* Forces?

It muſt be confeſt that while *France* was debating whether we ſhou'd have *Dunkirk* or not, or rather how much of it ſhou'd be in our Power, and his Grace, to humour a little the impatience of the People for one Active Campagne, had *Orders* to *concur in a Siege*; upon which that of *Queſnoy* was undertaken, however the Place had not been long inveſted before the *Britiſh* General ſends to acquaint Prince *Eugene* that his Troops ſhou'd not continue in the Army, unleſs he gave it over. To which his Highneſs reply'd, *That inſtead of putting a ſtop to the Siege, he would cauſe it to be proſecuted with all imaginable Vigour; and that he would let his Grace be witneſs of another Expedition which he deſign'd to put in Execution immediately after the taking that Town.* The Prince obſerv'd ſo many Expreſſes paſs between the Duke and the *French* Army, he began to be jealous of the ſafety of that of the Confederates, and lookt upon the *Britiſh* Forces to be ſo far from Friends, that it is ſaid he ſhou'd tell the General of the Allies at a Council of War, *He ſhou'd be glad if they wou'd march off, they being now only a Burthen to the* Netherlands, *ſince they had declar'd they wou'd not fight againſt France.* Happy had it been for the Allies if the *Britiſh* General and *Britiſh* Troops had not taken the Field in the Campagne of 1712, they had then depended on their own ſtrength, and not expos'd their Forces to be Butcher'd at *Dinain* in dependance upon a Superiority which they loſt by the Deſertion of the *Britons*. A ſcandal not to the Nation, nor to the Soldiers who muſt be hang'd if they are not obedient. But then they do not know what they go about, and are ſervilely acted by the Breath of their General, which is called *Orders*; the Caſe is different ſure, when People do underſtand what they go about, and when they do not.

I ſhall now examine that part of the Conduct which relates to the Tranſactions in the Camp after the Siege of *Queſnoy*, by the taking of which there were great rejoycings all over the *Netherlands*; the Earl of *Strafford* arriv'd from *England*, when theſe Rejoycings were made at the *Hague*, and inquiring into the occaſion of them, was told 'twas for the reduction of *Queſnoy*; a Conqueſt ſo mean in his opinion that he term'd it a *Bicoque* a Paltry place, to inſult the Army of the Allies. An Air his Excellency

cellency was very fond of ever ſince he was recall'd from making Viſits and Balls at *Berlin*.

It has been obſerv'd more than once, that we had a Thouſand Obligations old and new, to *puſh on the War with Vigour*; that the Duke of *Ormond's Inſtructions* were in the ſame Stile, *unleſs an honourable Peace* could be procur'd for the Allies, as well as our ſelves. It has been ſhewn as far as was neceſſary for a thing ſo obvious, that the *Terms* of the *Peace* then Negotiating were *Scandalous*; not one Condition was offer'd to better them, and now we ſhall ſee how we perform our Aſſurances of *puſhing on a Vigorous War: Queſnoy*, contrary to the Opinion of the *Britiſh General*, is Beſieg'd by the *Imperial* and *Dutch* Troops, but he would not ſend a Man *of thoſe which were in Her Majeſty's whole Pay to aſſiſt them.*

After the Siege of *Queſnoy*, the *Correſpondence* between the Duke of *Ormond* and the Mareſchal *de Villars* grows very ſtrict. *Letters* paſs from one to another almoſt daily, at the ſame time that we were told from the *Throne* in *England*, that there were no *ſeparate Meaſures* taking. Mareſchal *Villars* is alarm'd at the *Confederates* Beſieging that Town, immediately he writes of it to the Duke, and his Grace to ſet him at Eaſe again, aſſures the Mareſchal in his Anſwer, that *not a ſingle Man ſolely in the Queen's Pay* ſhall act againſt the place. There was now no *Ceſſation* of *Arms*; not one of the *Confederates* knew that we were treating about it with *France*, not one of them approv'd of the Conditions of *Peace* propos'd by *France*. Is not this a moſt unqueſtionable Inſtance of *betraying Allies?* The *French* were overjoy'd at their good Luck in getting the *Britiſh Miniſters* and *General* on their ſide, and notwithſtanding Mareſchal *Villars* was enjoyn'd *Secrecy* for their Sakes only; he could not help telling one of the Duke of *Wirtemburgh's Trumpeters, That the* Engliſh *would do the* French *no hurt*, and that the Duke of *Ormond* had Orders not to Fight. It is true, the Mareſchal deny'd that he told the *Trumpeter* ſo, upon the Duke's Writing to him about it; but it being ſo much for the *French* Intereſt to raiſe a Jealouſy, and if poſſible an Animoſity among the *Allies*, the ſureſt way of putting theſe Affairs into Confuſion,

I leave

I leave it to the Reader to determine, who is moſt likely to ſpeak Truth, the *French Mareſchal*, or the *German Trumpet*.

Indeed the *French* lookt upon the late *Miniſters* as a parcel of ignorant contemptible Creatures, whom they might do what they would with, becauſe *Peace* was as neceſſary to ſave their *Necks*, as to prevent the Ruin of the great *Lewis's Exorbitant Power*, and extirpate his Hopes of *Univerſal Monarchy*. Never did the old Bully play a meaner part than when *Bolingbroke* went to *France*. He ſtoopt ſo low as to Compliment that *ſpecial Spark*, upon the *Extent* of his *Capacity* in *Politicks*, he might have done it with as much Reaſon as the Extent of his Virtue. The Man was not a *Fool*, but was he therefore a Machiavel? What Experience in Affairs? What Solidity of Judgment did ever appear in any part of his Conduct? He could make *Speeches* and *Verſes*, write *Billetdoux*; he could *Droll*, and could *Drink*, but that was all, unleſs a Man would be ſo ungenerous as to remember his *Gallantry* alſo. Yet this was he who wrote all the *State Letters* to the Duke of *Ormond*, and whoſe Abilities *Abel Roper* told us, the Marquis *de Torcy*, and even the *French* King himſelf ſtood in fear of. A *Peace* manag'd by the Influence of ſuch a *Politician*, was like to be a bleſſed one; and what *General* would not be Ambitious of obeying *Inſtructions* of his penning, and his adviſing? The *French*, who knew the Characters of all the late Miniſters as well as any of us, us'd no Ceremony with them, but ſaid what they pleas'd when 'twas for their own purpoſe, whether it was for that of their good Friends in *England* or no.

As the *Diſpatches* of *Princes* have generally the *Air* of their *Miniſters* who write them, one ought in Juſtice to the Memory of her late Majeſty to impute that haughty Mien, which we find in the Viſcount *Bolingbroke's*, to his own inſolent Temper. *The Alarm and Clamour in* Holland *gives her Majeſty no uneaſineſs whatſoever*, ſays he; and again, *The States Remonſtrances upon the Duke of* Ormond's *refuſing to Fight has no other Effect on her Majeſty, than to make her renew the ſame Orders to the Duke:* All the kind things done by the late *Miniſters* or *General* for the *Confederates*, after the latter would not act with them, was a Letter from the Duke to the Mareſchal *de Villars*, and from the

Viſcount

Viſcount to the Mareſchal *de Torcy*, pag. 19, 20. to deſire that the *French* Army would not fall upon them before the *Ceſſation* of *Arms* was agreed to by *France* and *England*, that is, while they were beſieging *Queſnoy*. 'Tis very much to be doubted, whether the Noble Viſcount would not have been extreamly well pleas'd had *Villars* cut them all to pieces, and the *Engliſh* with the reſt of them, but things were not ripe in *England*; the People had not been told, that they muſt have a *ſeparate Peace*, and that the *French* were to have *Spain* and the *Indies*. The poor Souls did verily believe that there was a good *Peace* a hatching for them, and expected every Day when they ſhould ſet the Bells a Ringing, and the Bonefires a Blazing for a new *Victory* by the new *General*. They doubted not but the *Engliſh* had been ſo well taught to beat the *French* by the Duke of *Marlborough*, that they could have routed them by themſelves without any *General* at all; and therefore flatter'd themſelves, that they ſhould have one *Holy-Day* more. Had they all at once heard, that the Duke of *Ormonde* would *not Fight*, and that Prince *Eugene* was beaten, I believe the *Church* would not have been in half ſo much *Danger* as the late *Miniſters*; but when the latter had by *helping* the *Confederates*, and *abuſing* the old *General* and *Miniſters* by pretences of an advantageous *Peace*, and terrifying Stories of a *loud conſuming War*, brought them to be content with any thing for the ſake of the *Church* and the late *Managers*; then it was that they ſaid, and did what they thought fit, and without Trembling.

It is amazing to me, that any one who pretended a Friendſhip for his Grace the Duke of *Ormonde* ſhould have expos'd thoſe Papers to Light, which are publiſh'd in the *Conduct*. For what a Figure does his Grace make, while Prince *Eugene* and the *States-General* are repreſenting to him the Diſhonour of breaking ſo many Treaties, and ſo many Declarations, ſome of them very late ones? " *That not only the Treaty of the grand Alliance*, " but others oblig'd Her Majeſty to puſh on the War with Vi- " gour; but the Declarations the Duke made, that he could " not act 'till further Orders, at a time when by his Grace's " own Approbation they had march'd juſt within ſight of the " Enemy, and when there was a fair Proſpect of Succeſs, if

" ſomething were attempted, could not they thought be re-
" conciled either with theſe Treaties, or the repeated Aſſu-
" rances which her Majeſty had given them by Letters by my
" Lord *Strafford*, and by his Grace lately at the *Hague*.

I have already obſerv'd, that 'tis Torture to a generous Mind to remember the Tranſactions this Year, to think of what we were bound to do, what we might have done, and what we did. For alas! as much as we know at Home of the *Faction* that was in all this Matter, we find by woful Experience that the Confederates look on it as a National Treachery, and will never think otherwiſe 'till the Offenders are puniſh'd. Theſe Miniſters deſir'd his Grace, if he had any Regard to thoſe Treaties and Aſſurances which ought to be kept Sacred to puſh on the War with Vigour. They then ſent to him to know, if he would not Fight, whether he would cover a Siege, and in caſe of Refuſal, mark what they ſay, *They did in the ſtrongeſt Terms proteſt againſt the irreparable Damage which ſuch a Conduct would occaſion to the Confederacy*; they do not ſay which his Conduct *might Occaſion*, but which it would, and his Grace had certainly fair warning of it. The Duke was pleas'd to give them no other Anſwer, but *that he ſhould be glad to receive Letters from* England *firſt*. The *Goodneſs and Superiority of the Confederate Troops was not to be contradicted*, as himſelf confeſſes; the opportunity was as advantageous as that Goodneſs and Superiority, but we muſt Sacrifice all to the flattering View of the *Peace* we now enjoy. This Subject is too Tragical for Reflection, the pain of thinking upon it is intolerable, and I will in pity to the Reader ſpare him the Torment.

We are told, That *in debating this Matter, one of the States Deputies took too much Liberty in cenſuring the Proceedings of* England: How, I pray, was that poſſible? Was not our Army leaving them at the Mercy of their Enemies? Were we not, in Breach of every thing Sacred among our *Allies*, about to give up all the Advantages of Ten Years Victorious War? Who were the *Managers* of theſe *Proceedings*; the *Treaſurer*, the *Chancellor*, the *Secretary*? Who the Inſtrument, the *Hero* of the *Conduct*? Who deſir'd his Excellency to *forbear*, as every Man would have done in the like Caſe, for ſurely it could not be very entertaining

ing to hear what a *Foreigner* might with Reaſon ſay of our *Proceedings* at that fatal Juncture.

All the *Letters* that we have, and all the *Orders* and *Diſpatches* were from *Secretary* St. *John*; I do not ſay that he did not get the *Queen* to ſet her *Hand* to them, or to give her conſent that he ſhould write thus, but who would have accepted ſo important a charge under the Direction of ſo corrupt and ſo lewd a Miniſter? The General might very well have taken it for granted, that *O——d*, *H——t*, *B——ke* ſaid and did every thing. He was too old a Courtier not to know how he came by his *Orders* and *Inſtructions*, and ſince the Fate of *Europe* was ſo much concern'd in his *Conduct*; how could he conſent to give himſelf up to be directed by three ſuch Men as thoſe above-mention'd, unleſs he was in the Secret himſelf, approv'd of what they were doing, or knew nothing of it, and there is no great odds in it whether he was the one or the other?

Secretary St. *John* ſending another Letter to confirm the former *Orders not to Fight*, the *General* in anſwer ſays, *The Allies made no ſcruple of ſaying we were betraying them.* What then? what Matters it whether we were betraying them or not, as long as we have Mr. St. *John*'s Orders for what we do? Well! for my part, if *Men of Honour* can reconcile theſe things to *common Juſtice*, or *Men* of *Underſtanding* bring them within the Verge of *common Senſe*, I will have done with the Queſtion. In the cloſe of this Letter, there is a paſſage which muſt come from a Sentiment quite different from that which produc'd the *Unlimited Obedience* we Glory ſo much of in this ſo glorious a Campagne; and 'tis ſtrange, that where ſo juſt a Thought could be form'd, a Reſolution could be taken to abandon the *Confederates* in the midſt of certain *Victory*. *If there be no Proſpect of Action*, ſays the Writer of the Letter, *I do not ſee of what uſe I am here, and if it ſuit with her Majeſty's Service I ſhould be glad I might have leave to return to* England. I do not pretend to a Character of *Heroiſm*, and yet I think it would have been impoſſible for me to have *deſerted* the *Allies*, when the opportunity was ſo fair of putting an End to the *Tyranny* of *France* for ever, though my Head had paid for my *Diſobedience*. I would have been proud of that *Diſloyalty* which had ſav'd the *Honour* of my *Sovereign*,

and the *Liberty* of my *Country*. I would neither have obey'd Mr. *Secretary* St. *John's Orders*, nor have *return'd* to *England*; but have done as many a brave *Roman* and brave *Briton* too have done for the good of all *Europe*, have fought with my *Friends* at all Ventures, and have left my *Reward* to *Providence*. This I know will be deem'd *Romantick*, but the Temptation of ruining the *Power* of *France*, of Eſtabliſhing the *Proteſtant Religion* and the *Liberties* of *Europe*, would have been too mighty for the pleaſure of laying a profound Obedience to a ſet of Men who were declar'd *Traytors* to their *Confederates*, and for Reaſons againſt which I had not one Word to object, ſent *Orders* to the Duke to *deſert* our old *Friends* and *Confederates*, the Partners of our *Toils* and *Perils*, and of our *Victories* and *Glories*, in favour of the moſt potent and moſt inveterate *Enemy* of our *Church* and *Conſtitution*.

We have ſaid ſo much of the Unreaſonableneſs and Injuſtice of the *Proceedings* about the *Peace*, that it would equally be tedious and impertinent to ſay any more of an *Evil* ſo much felt and fear'd. The *Secretary* brags however to the *General*, That when the *Queſtion* was put, that the *Queen would ſend Orders to his Grace to Fight, it was carry'd in the Commons without a Diviſion, and in the Lords by a Majority of* 28. I remember when the ſame Houſe divided about the partial and unjuſt Vote concerning the Two and a Half *per Cent*; one of the *Members* told me, that an *Affirmative* Man cry'd out, *By G—— we have carry'd it ſwimmingly, and Faith*, ſays the other, *I believe you might have carry'd the Pretender by the ſame Majority, by G—— I believe we ſhould*, quoth the *Tory*, and o' my Conſcience there was hardly a *Vote* given for the *Peace*, by a Man who knew what that *Peace* was, but would have gone for the *Chevalier*, as well as it did for *France*. *The Spirit which was then ſhewn in both Houſes*, continues the Secretary, *was more conſiderable, and a better Omen than even the Majority by which they prevail'd*. This *Spirit* was a true *High Church Impudence*, with a mixture of *Tory Inſolence*, the Characteriſticks of their Spiritual and Temporal *Tyranny*. If they *argu'd*, they only *aſſerted*; if they *debated*, 'twas by *dividing*, and thus in *Argument*, and in *Debate*, they call'd it *Spirit*. The Truth is the *Spirit* of the Man, who ſays it was of this make,

Inſolence

Inſolence in *greater* things, and *Pertneſs* in *leſs*. The *Dutch* who found themſelves *betray'd* in *England*, *deſerted* in *Flanders*, and *bully'd* in *France*, thought it adviſable to give good Words to ſuch Men as could deal thus by them, for fear they ſhould yet do worſe. What, might they not think them capable of, even to the Deſtruction of their *Commonwealth*? It was therefore to cajole them a little, that Monſieur *Welderen*, and Monſieur *Hop*, came to confer with the Duke the 13th of *June*, that the one renounced *Whiggery*, and the other beg'd pardon for having preſum'd to cenſure ſuch wiſe and honourable *Proceedings* as thoſe of the publick Miniſters. They worſhipp'd them as ſome of the *Indians* worſhip the *Devil*, not only out of any Hopes of their doing them *Good*, but to hinder their doing them *Evil*, all the fair Speeches of the Miniſters of the Allies, *pag.* 20, 21. cannot be imputed to this Sentiment and no other; for the late *Miniſters* never took one ſtep in all their four *Years Miniſtry* which was approv'd of either at *Home* or *Abroad* by any wiſe and honeſt Men, *Proteſtants* and Friends to *Liberty*.

I ſhall incert the following Paragraph for no other Reaſon, but becauſe I do not believe one Word of it; and the Reaſon I do not believe one Word of it is, becauſe the *States General* in their *Memorial* aſſure the late Queen, they never had and never would enter into any *ſeparate Negotiation*, that they never had and never would treat with *France* directly or indirectly, but in *Concert* with her Majeſty. If any one has a greater Opinion of the Veracity of the Conduct than of the *Memorial*, he will certainly be thankful to me for repeating this paſſage, a moſt incredible one that ever I met with even in a *Tory* Author.

But at this very Juncture advice came from good Hands in Holland, *that the* Dutch *had engag'd Mr.* P——m *to propoſe in their Name to the Marquis of* Torcy *a ſeparate Negotiation with* France, *excluſive of* England, *and to repreſent to him the particular Advantages* France *might promiſe it ſelf from ſuch a Treaty*; the good Hands aforeſaid I take to be the two *Britiſh Plenipotentiaries*, and ſuch News could not come from better. The occaſion of writing it could only be this, all the World cry'd out that we were making a dangerous and ſcandalous *Peace*, that it was a Clandeſtine ſeparate One; what if it is? The *Dutch* have offer'd to

do

do the ſame bad thing, and why may not we do it as well as they? The *Tory* Miniſters did not deſire a better Excuſe for doing what was unjuſt and wicked, than that others have done or would do it if they could? This is the ſole Reaſon of inserting a paſſage which will have no Credit with any one that can think and know any thing of the matter.

The Biſhop of *Briſtol*, one of thoſe *Plenipotentiaries* took care to give the Duke of *Ormond* an Account of a very handſome and reaſonable Conference he had with the Miniſters and our Allies at *Utretcht*, whom he told roundly, that the Queen would not ſpeak a Word for them, *unleſs they came immediately into her Meaſures*; 'tis no Matter whether they like them or not, they were not to judge for themſelves, and their pretending to know what was their Intereſt better than the Lord *Strafford* or his Colleague, the Biſhop, was enough to procure Orders for that Proteſtant Prelate to tell them, the Queen *look'd upon her ſelf to be under no Obligation to them.* How glorious it was for a *Father* of our Reform'd Church to be employ'd in an Embaſſy to treat of a Peace, every important Article of which was for the Intereſt of the *French* King, the greateſt Perſecutor of our Religion that ever was ſince the *Reformation?* As to the Lord *Strafford*'s part in it, ſo much Notice is not to be taken of it. He had been a *Soldier* and a *Courtier* from his Youth, and *Courtiers* and *Soldiers* know better things than to refuſe a good offer to make their Fortune.

We come now to a very long expreſs from Mr. *Secretary* about the *Ceſſation* of *Arms* in the *Netherlands*, on Condition King *Philip* I's. *Renunciation* came over, and *Dunkirk* was deliver'd up. What a rare Buſineſs *Philip's Renunciation* is, and what a rare *Bargain* we made in giving *Mardyke* for *Dunkirk* is too well known to need any Animadverſion.

In this Expreſs the *Secretary* ſays, *It is with the greateſt Regret Her Majeſty finds Her ſelf conſtrain'd to come to ſuch Extremities with her Allies, but what Remedy had ſhe left.* Believe this who can, if we had had any ſuch Regret for reducing our Confederates to the neceſſity of accepting a Peace of the *French* King on his own Terms, it had been full in our Power to have given them ſatisfaction by ſacrificing thoſe that wou'd have betray'd them by continuing the War, and giving the Duke of *Marlborough* the

the Duration of it. A General in whoſe *Sincerity* the Allies put an intire Confidence, and on whoſe Valour and Wiſdom the Soldiers depended for Conqueſt. I will dare affirm that there is not a Man upon Earth who is the leaſt acquainted with the *Britiſh* Affairs at that Juncture, but believes as firmly as he believes the Goſpel, or his Being, that the late Managers did not put an end to the War purely out of Love to their Country, but out of a baſe Proſpect to ſerve their Pride and Avarice, by continuing the Power they had Uſurpt, which cou'd not be done by *War*. Had the Queen reſolv'd to carry it on heartily in Conjunction with the Confederates, they knew both the Princes of the Confederacy their Generals and Soldiers wou'd be impatient to have the Old Victorious General in the Field again, they knew none of 'em wou'd even truſt the War to their Management, and that if the neceſſity of Affairs oblig'd the Queen to continue the Duke of *Marlborough* Captain General, his Grace wou'd of courſe have great influence in our Councils, and knowing what ſort of Men they were, wou'd never conſent to act in any thing they had a Hand in. His Reputation was of too great value to be at the mercy of his Enemy, and it wou'd not have been agreeable with all the other Parts of his Grace's Conduct, if he had ever ſo far comply'd with the madneſs of the Times as to have fallen in with meaſures which wou'd alone have ſullied all the Glory he had acquir'd in a Ten Years War. 'Twas to eſtabliſh themſelves therefore, and for nothing elſe that the late Managers hurried on a Treaty of Peace, and the firſt ſtep they took in it, the ſuing for it by a Meſſenger ſent to *France*, was ſo Criminal, that they thought it cou'd not be worſe, let the Treaty end as it wou'd, and it muſt be a Peace to ſave themſelves from accounting for what they had done to procure one. What Regret then cou'd ſuch Men have, for let the Fate of the Allies be as bad as cou'd be, we muſt every where underſtand when they talk of Peace, themſelves only, their Poſts and Penſions, their Power and Influence which they wou'd have kept, tho' the whole World had periſhed. The Secretary asks, *What Remedy had the Queen left?*

left? And I ask what occaſion had ſhe for a Remedy? Her Affairs were proſperous Abroad and at Home, *France* at the brink of Deſtruction. We have ſhewn that this Inglorious Campagne might have finiſh'd what *Blenheim* begun, had a General commanded the *Britiſh* Army, who came into the Field with the ſame Diſpoſition as the General at *Blenheim*. The Miniſtry by their Vile Intrigues had ruin'd our Credit, deſtroy'd all manner of Confidence among the Confederates; had ſpirited our Enemies, and diſheartned our Friends, and now they cry out, who cou'd have helpt it.

The *Secretary* in this Letter tells the Duke, That the Allies wou'd not come into the Queen's Meaſures, *Becauſe ſome Benefit was like to accrue to her Subjects by a Peace.* He himſelf was not ſo devoid of Modeſty as to ſay Her Subjects wou'd have any *mighty Benefit by*, but *ſome Benefit* only which fell into very few Hands; for the Publick had been Beggared and undone if that Adminiſtration had continued much longer. Our Trade is loſt, our Alliance broke, our Friends are weaken'd, our Enemies ſtrengthen'd; this is all the good the *Peace* has done us. What is become of the Millions we were to get by the *South-Sea* Trade? What of the Mountains of Gold that were to riſe out of the *Aſſiento?* What of the immenſe Riches that wou'd accrue to us by changing *Newfound-Land* for *Cape Briton?* What of our Security in the Demoliſhing of *Dunkirk*, to make room for a better and ſtronger Harbour 100 Yards of it? Some Benefit we were to get by it. But thanks be to God we may now chuſe whether we will have it or no: What cou'd that Benefit be unleſs it was to the Pretender? We have examin'd all the other Bleſſings of the Peace, and there is nothing left but *Popery and Slavery.*

The Secretary having conſulted *Count Gallas*, and the reſt of the Miniſters of the Allies, he now gives Inſtructions to the Duke to *ſpeak the ſame Language to the Generals of the Foreign Troops*, Let us be all of a Piece, and give 'em to underſtand that they have nothing to hope for from our Friendſhip, or our Wiſdom, that we are reſolv'd upon Peace, and in our own Way, without minding what we ſhould do for them, and if they will be paid what we owe them, they muſt do as we wou'd have them.

This

this is giving the Law to Friends and not to Enemies; this is making uſe of the Power to which the Allies had contributed to humble and mortifie them in Complacency to the *French* againſt whom that Power was form'd. The Expreſs is no ſooner receiv'd by the *Britiſh General* than immediately a *Trumpet is ſent* to the *Mareſchal de Villars*, and he is told that his Grace is going to viſit Prince *Eugene* and the States Deputies, *to perſwade them to raiſe the Siege of* Queſnoy, *and declare to them, that in caſe of Refuſal, he ſhould be oblig'd to withdraw the Army of the Queen*; all this was done, though the Duke had only receiv'd a Copy of the Articles for the *Ceſſation* of *Arms*, and ſurely it was neceſſary conſidering that he had to deal with the *French* to ſee always the *Original*. His *Grace* was conſcious of this himſelf, ſaying, *He wiſhes the Marquis of* Torcy *would have given himſelf the Trouble to have ſign'd the Copy of the Articles which would have been more regular, and more agreeable to the Duke's Inſtructions*. People are not us'd when the Affairs of Peace and War among mighty Nations are concern'd to take one another's Words in Articles; and the *French* eſpecially, whom there is not a Miniſter upon Earth that would truſt for a Trifle, yet we were in ſuch a cloſe League with them, that as we ſay in our Letter to the Mareſchal *de Villars*, *We would not obſtruct the accompliſhing ſo good a Work, by raiſing Difficulties and Scruples, and inſiſting too much upon the want of Formality*; yet ſurely of all the Forms in the World, there are none of ſo much conſequence as ſetting our Hand and Seal to *Covenants*, eſpecially Covenants, where Kingdoms are to be preſerv'd or deſtroy'd by them. I mention this only to ſhew what good Friends we were all of a ſudden become with the common Enemy.

His Grace did as he ſaid, the very ſame Day viſiting the Prince of *Savoy* and the *States Deputies*, he told them he could no longer cover the Siege of *Queſnoy*. He alſo ſet forth the wonderful Advantages of having *Dunkirk* deliver'd up as a *cautionary Town*, which however the Confederates could not be well ſatisfy'd in. They did not think the putting *Dunkirk* into the Poſſeſſion of the late Miniſters could be any Benefit to the Allies; they doubted not it would be yielded up juſt as it was, and the *French* be as much Maſters as ever. Theſe Managers were ſo

weak as to ſanſie the Confederates did not know who they were and what they were, that they did not ſee through their thin Diſguiſes, and deſpiſe their vain Pretences. When afterwards the *Britiſh* Troops had *Ghent* and *Bruges*, all the Enemies of *France* lookt upon thoſe two Towns as much in *French* Hands with reſpect to the common Cauſe, as they were when *Vendoſme* ſurpriz'd them four Years before. And who could blame the *Dutch*, whoſe Intelligence was as good as our own to ſpeak the worſt of it, for giving Orders not to let the *Britiſh* Forces into their Towns. The uſage they met with at *Ghent* and *Bruges* ſhews, what would have been the fatal Conſequences of it. They had ſooner been forc'd to accept of Peace, and perhaps a worſe Peace than that of *Utrecht* as bad as it was.

The late Managers affect to talk, as if every Body lookt upon them as they did upon their Predeceſſors, and was bound to uſe them after the ſame manner, as if they had not acquir'd their Power by Faction and Violence, by the Weakneſs of ſome, and the Folly of others, as if they had done nothing to give Occaſion of Diſtruſt and Reſentment, but were the wiſeſt and moſt harmleſs Men in Chriſtendom. The Prince of *Savoy* and the Deputies told the Duke, That his *marching away with the Queen's Troops, and the Foreigners in her Pay, would leave them to the Mercy of the* French. They needed not be *Conjurers* to know that, or what it was that the late Miniſters deſign'd by it, and they had been Ideots if they had not in time taken care to keep as many of thoſe Troops as they could together in the Confederate Army.

Let us now inquire how the Foreign Generals behav'd themſelves, when the *Britiſh Hero* ſounded them to inform himſelf of their Diſpoſition to deſert the Confederate Army; *They pretended*, ſays the Duke, *they could not ſeparate from it without expreſs Directions from their Maſters*; *they alledg'd, that neither the grand Alliance nor the particular Conventions admitted of any Parties treating of, or making Peace, or even a Suſpenſion of Arms without conſent of the others.* Upon which it is ſaid, *The Duke thought it belonged not to him to enter into theſe laſt Particulars*; if it had, how eaſy would it have been to have prov'd that there was not one Article of the grand Alliance which bound down the Confede-

rates

rates to act always in concert, that there was nothing ſtipulated by us with the Emperor, with the King of *Portugal*, or the Duke of *Savoy* about the reſtoring the *Spaniſh Monarchy* to the Houſe of *Auſtria*, and that the Allies were always at Liberty to make Ceſſation of Arms, and ſeparate Treaties as each of them found it for his Intereſt. If it had belong'd to us to have debated theſe laſt Particulars with the Confederate Generals, their Mouths had been ſtopt that way with a little arguing, but the ſhorteſt was to inſiſt *on the Commands we had receiv'd from Secretary* St. John, *and that it would be reſented if they did not comply*, pag. 26, which was done accordingly.

The Generals of the Allies having Maſters who had more Honour than to break the Alliance for the ſake of a few factious Spirits, and their Troops having Orders not to leave *Prince* Eugene, his Grace gives preſent Notice of it to the *French* General, and the next Letter from Mr. *Secretary* directs him to know of the Mareſchal *de Villars*, *What help might be expected from him for our taking Poſſeſſion of* Dunkirk, pag. 27. a very wiſe Queſtion, and it alſo puts the Duke in Mind of that neceſſary Vote of Parliament, which *made the Queen abſolutely Miſtreſs of her own Conduct*, a happy Vote, that in the Queen's Name put it in the Power of the late Managers to be abſolute, and take Pattern from the *French* in governing us.

In the remaining part of the Conduct we ſhall have ſeveral Inſtances of the exact Agreement there is between the *French* and their Friends in *England* in their Sentiments of the *Dutch*, and the *Whigs*, whom they both hated alike. Mareſchal *Villars* expreſſing his ſurprize, that the Foreign Troops would not march off with the *Britiſh*, ſays he is aſtoniſh'd; *That the* Dutch *ſhould have more Power over Men which they did not Pay to make them hazard their Lives, than the Queen who had paid them theſe Dozen Years ſhould have to perſwade them not to expoſe themſelves to any Danger*. I can tell the Mareſchal why, all the Confederates had an entire Confidence in the *Dutch*, that they would do nothing againſt their common Intereſts, and would on the contrary exert themſelves to the utmoſt in the Defence of their own Liberties, and the Liberties of their Allies. This made them ſend Inſtructions to their Generals to follow the Example

of the Commander in Chief of the *Dutch* Forces, whereas they knew the Miniſtry of *England* to be the Reverſe of the *States General*, and the Troops who had gain'd ſo many Victories in the common Cauſe, were not ſuch Mercenaries as to prefer two or three Month's Pay, to promiſing all of them with a Laſting, Safe, and Honourable Peace.

What the Mareſchal *de Villars* wrote to the Duke in his next Letter, intimating, that the *French* King requir'd the marching off of all the *Britiſh* Auxiliaries as well as the National Troops, as an Article on which the Surrendry of *Dunkirk* depended, ſeems to be a Feint. The Court of *France* knew full well, that the place would not be Surrender'd ſo effectually, but that they ſhould be as much Maſters of it as the *Engliſh*, and therefore did not intend to inſiſt on the Duke's withdrawing all the Forces in the Queen's Pay. That was not in his Power, and ſo to have inſiſted as an impracticable Thing would have occaſion'd the breaking off the Treaty, which was too beneficial to *France* to admit of a Thought of that Nature. But ſuch Claims ſerv'd to blind, and make, as if there was ſomething ſerious in a Treaty that was all Farce. 'Twas reſolv'd at *Verſailles* and St. *James*'s that it ſhould be, and that the Allies ſhould be the Sufferers; 'twas finiſh'd at firſt, and the Progreſs and Concluſion of it, all Affectation. Sure never was a Matter of ſo much conſequence manag'd with ſuch Prevarication and Deceit.

Having taken Notice of a fling of Mareſchal *Villars*'s againſt the *Dutch*, the next Letter from the Secretary has another of the ſame kind; he is ſpeaking of the Surrender of *Dunkirk*, *Nothing*, quoth he, *can be more dreadful to the* Dutch *than this Town in* Engliſh *Hands*. There's never a Paltry *Weſt Country* Politician inſpir'd by *October* only, but could have ſaid as much, 'tis the Cant of the Faction. The *Dutch* are always encroaching upon our Trade; the *Dutch* are more our Enemies than the *French*; the *Dutch* muſt be humbled as well as the *French* reduc'd. And what Occaſions all this Clamour? Why, the *Dutch* hate Tyranny, and love Liberty, which is quite contrary to our *Tory* Principles and Practices; why ſhould the *Dutch* be afraid of the Surrender of *Dunkirk*, unleſs they knew that to deliver it up to this Secretary's Agents was to keep it for *France*

and

and the *Pretender?* What harm could *Dunkirk* do them, unleſs we were at War with them, and that will never be 'till we are weary of our Religion and Liberty?

To keep his Grace in Heart, the Secretary tells him in the next Letter of the 20th of *June*, that my Lord *Strafford* was coming to the Camp, and with ſuch Inſtructions as ſhou'd give him intire Satisfaction. My Lord *Strafford* carries Content and Joy with him where ever he comes, as if inſtead of being a Colonel of Horſe he was the Dove that brought the *Olive Branch* to the *Ark*. But we ſhall find by and by that his Lordſhip carry'd nothing better with him than his *New Garter*, for all he had to ſay to his Grace was the ſame thing over and over again, that we muſt have a Peace, and will have a Peace, that we car'd not for the Allies, wou'd do what we wou'd, and laugh at all oppoſition.

St. John, one ſhou'd not give a higher Title to ſo great an offender, when he wrote next, complains of the Difficulties rais'd by the *Enemies of Peace*. What a vile Reflection is this? who were Enemies to a good Peace? But firſt would thoſe Managers call their own infamous ruinous Treaty a *Peace*, and generally to name it without an Epithet, they themſelves having not the *Effronterie* to ſay it was a good one, except when they were to impoſe on the Kingdom by a Vote of their Majority whom they made to ſpeak as they wou'd have them, whatever reaſons there were in the *Hanover* and *Dutch* Memorials, in the Lords Proteſts, in the Remonſtrances of the Miniſters of the Confederates at *Utrecht*; the Secretary ſays, We have *taken a firm and immoveable Reſolution not to give the leaſt way to thoſe that obſtruct the Peace*; but to act in *concert with the* French *King*; and here comes a cruel ſtroke againſt the Whigs and the *Dutch*, and all that are Enemies to *France*. *The Queen doubts not but ſhe ſhall be able to defeat the laſt Efforts of thoſe who either ſought their own Intereſts, or gratified their private Reſentments in prolonging the Miſeries of War.* The prevailing Faction were not ſuch *Fools* but they knew if they cou'd once get the People to think the Old Miniſters were for continuing the War only for the Money they got by it, and that the *Dutch* made their Market

ket of that very War, which beggar'd them, they ſhou'd then paſs for Patriots and publick ſpirited Men; wherefore this alſo was their Cant, and the ſtupid People were made to believe that thoſe Men who had neither Conſcience nor Fortune wou'd ſerve them faithfully and generouſly, and ſtudied nothing but their Intereſt and Peace. In the ſame Letter Mr. Secretary tells his Grace that if the Foreign Generals do not obey him, *Her Majeſty will look upon it as a Declaration of their Maſters againſt her.* And to ſhew how exact he was in his Judgment and Intelligence of the matter, *to be ſure*, ſays he very Elegantly, *the greateſt part of their Forces will march with you.* There's hardly any Body but remembers the Queen declar'd ſhe wou'd make no Separate Peace; and that Her Treaſurer ſaid ſuch a Peace wou'd be *Knaviſh*, *Fooliſh*, and *Villainous*. But the Secretary, notwithſtanding what had been told the Parliament by the Queen, that there was no Separate Treaty, yet he muſt by the Treaſurer's Expreſſions be a *Knave*, *Fool* and *Villain* for having a Hand in it, but he faithfully declares *that if the Foreign Troops refuſe to obey the Duke of* Ormond, *Her Majeſty would no longer make any ſcruple of concluding Her PARTICULAR PEACE, and wou'd ſet a time for Others to come in upon thoſe Conditions which ſhou'd be agreed upon between Her and* France. Can any thing be plainer than this betraying our Confederates to the Common Enemy? If the Allies will not agree to the late Managers Terms, *Torcy* and *St. John* are by this Letter, *pag.* 33. to ſettle the Conditions which the Confederates are to be obliged to accept of. Here is Communication of Treaties, here acting in conſort with Allies? Had we no further light to receive in this dark affair, from the Grand Inquiſition of the Nation. This ſure is enough to convince every reaſonable Creature what ought to be the fate of ſuch a Counſellor who having ſaid this in a Letter to the Marquis *de Torcy*, which was alſo ſent to the Duke of *Ormond* as *Inſtructions*, does not ſtick to reveal the Secrets of our beſt Allies, and to expoſe their weakneſs, *The Dutch*, ſays he, *are far from being able to ſupport any new expence, are not in Circumſtances to bear*

their

their preſent Charge. Here's Treachery with a Witneſs, and 'tis extreamly kind and impartial in the *Publiſher* of the *Conduct* to acquaint us with it.

One cannot paſs over the Extraordinary Eulogy which his Grace beſtows on the Earl of *Strafford*, who was to be ſent to the Camp. This New Earl and Knight of the Garter, had ſold the Crown as its Miniſter at *Hanover* and *Berlin* who were entirely in the Intereſts of *Great Britain*, where every thing went ſmoothly, where there was no need of any Genius for Negotiation, and conſequently our *Gazette* ſeldom inform'd us of any thing done there by the *Engliſh* Miniſter but making *Entries* and *Feaſts*, hearing *Audiences* and receiving *Preſents*. 'Twas at their ſitting that the late Miniſters ſhou'd ſend for two Northern *Envoys*, where a couple of *Secretaries* wou'd do all the Buſineſs as well as two Embaſſadors to tranſact ſo fine a Buſineſs as a Treaty of Peace; but doubtleſs they were ſure both of their Men and their Treaty, or wou'd have found other Heads to have manag'd it; nevertheleſs his Grace is pleaſed to expreſs his Satisfaction in the *Advantage he ſhall have of the Earl of* Straffords *long Experience and good Advice*; who it ſeems did not anſwer his expectations, for after the firſt Conference with the Earl the Author of the *Conduct* owns *the Duke wiſh'd his Lordſhip had brought thoſe Lights he had ſo much reaſon to expect.* Whereas I verily believe the late *Managers* truſted no Body but themſelves with their *Lights*, and all their *Under-ſpurs* were forc'd to be content with their Intelligence by Bills as their Maſters had occaſion to employ them.

Having already hinted what exact Agreement there was between the Church and Miniſters of *France* and *England* during the *Management* of the Runnaway Secretary and his Accomplices, I ſhall give a new Inſtance of it in a Paſſage of a Letter from *Mareſchal-Villars* to the Duke of *Ormond*, *I ſee the Queen has taken her laſt Reſolutions to finiſh the Great Work of Peace with Firmneſs and Spirit which has been ſo long obſtructed by a Malignant Party, and by the ſelf-intereſt of ſome private Perſons, as well as Princes.* His Grace is not pleas'd with receiving this Letter only, but ſuffers it to be made publick, tho'

tho' there is nothing in it but a ſtale groundleſs Reflection on the Duke of *Marlborough*, who having beaten the *French* from the *Danube* to the Sea, will certainly never have a good word from them. In this Letter we are told that the General of the Common Enemy *approved of our ſending Troops from* England *to take poſſeſſion of* Dunkirk, *and thought it for the Intereſt of* England *and* France; Intereſts rarely well coupled, *that the Duke ſhou'd ſtay at the Head of as great a Body of Men as poſſible:* It was without doubt for the Intereſt of *France* that the Duke ſhou'd carry as many Men away with him as he cou'd; and accordingly his Grace did his utmoſt to prevail with all the Generals of the Foreign Troops in *Britiſh* Pay to abandon the Imperialiſts and the *Dutch*. It was ſaid that the King of *Pruſſia* wou'd come into the Queen's Peace, but the Report of it coming to the brave Prince of *Anhalt Deſſau*'s Ears, he reply'd, *they were all* Poltrons *who reported the King of* Pruſſia *wou'd ſeparate from the Allies*. The Generals of the *Saxon* and *Hanover* Forces when the Duke demanded of them if they wou'd obey his Orders, and withdraw from the Confederate Army, declar'd they ſhou'd *loſe their Heads if they did*, as it is expreſt in the *Conduct*, the Prince of *Heſſe Caſſel* ſaid, *he wou'd obey the Duke's Orders and March, if it was to fight the* French, but he cou'd not comply with them to deſert the Allies and betray the Cauſe. The Sentiments of ſo many *Heroes*, one wou'd think, might have had another effect on a *Britiſh* mind than it had in the deſection that follow'd.

The Secretary is indeed very poſitive in his Injunctions for it, *no Caſe can poſſibly happen in which Her Majeſty will allow that any other Meaſures ſhall be taken.* This is very extraordinary, tho every Man of the Confederate Army was to be cut to pieces, *Flanders* over-run, *Holland* Conquer'd, *France* Univerſal Miſtreſs, the Pretender to be impos'd upon us, and all our Fears and Terrors to come to paſs, yet no Caſe can happen to make the late Miniſters alter the Meaſures that had been concerted with *France*, he may well run away after ſuch a Notable Declaration.

The *Mareſchal de Villars* writing to the Duke about his *withdrawing*, ſays, *He believes the Diſturbers of the Publick Quiet*

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would not afterwards dare to trouble it any longer; I wonder how an *Engliſhman* could read ſuch Stuff. The *French* are not then the Diſturbers of the publick Quiet, the Troublers of the Repoſe of *Europe*, the Loſs of all the Blood that has been ſpilt, the Treaſures that have been ſpent, the Spoil that has been made. No, 'tis the *Germans* and the *Dutch*, if you will believe his Grace's new Correſpondent the Mareſchal *de Villars*.

Though our late Miniſters were reſolv'd to have a Peace to ſecure themſelves in their ill got Stations, yet had they not had farther Views than Peace only, what need was there of entering into Friendſhip with the *French* as well as into a Treaty; why might not the Confederates be ſuffer'd to carry on their War without our giving the Enemies, either Aſſiſtance or Intelligence? The former was not wanted, the *Maſſacre* at *Denain*, occaſion'd by the withdrawing the *Britiſh* Forces from the Allies, ſufficiently weaken'd them, and we were only requir'd to give the *French* an Account of what we knew of their Strength and Deſigns. The Mareſchal writes to the Duke to know, *What Number of the Enemies was left, becauſe he would not loſe a Moment* to fall upon them, which the Author of the Conduct ſays, *pag.* 43. was immediately ſent to Monſieur *Villars*, who in a Letter he wrote to the Duke of *Ormond*, ſays, *The* Dutch *Army is very bold in deſpiſing the Alliance and Kindneſs of the Queen, and the* Imperialiſts *very ungrateful for the great Aſſiſtances and Advantages they have had from* England. Mind how the *French* and their Faction in *England* agree in their Cant. 'Tis inſinuated, that Prince *Eugene* when he march'd to Beſiege *Landrecy* by the *Engliſh*, who would not go with him, expos'd to be Attack'd by the *French*, which was far from putting them to any Hazard of Loſs; that the Mareſchal offer'd *his Grace to Encamp if he thought proper in any of the King's Territories: The* Dutch, continues he, *being in Poſſeſſion of moſt of the Towns in* Flanders, *which they never would have been had the Generals which preceded his Grace, had a greater Regard to the Intereſts of their Queen and Country.* Sure the *French* Mareſchal muſt be very well ſatisfy'd, that the General he wrote to took great Delight in this Subject, the cenſuring the Duke of *Marlborough*'s Conduct, or he would not have done it in ſo many of his Letters. The Mareſchal in his laſt deſir'd an In-

terview with the Duke and my Lord *Strafford*, but his Grace notwithſtanding the *great Satisfaction he ſhould have in it, thought it would make a great deal of Noiſe, and give but too much Colour to thoſe who had now none at all to juſtify their Conduct.* The Reader muſt know how this matter lies, before he can make a right Judgment of what is ſaid in his Grace's Letter. The Enemies to *France* did Believe and Report, that not only the Miniſters, but the General had an Underſtanding with thoſe of *France* before the *Ceſſation* of *Arms* ; they did alſo believe, that notwithſtanding we were told there ſhould be no Separate Peace, and that the Peace ſhould be Safe, Honourable, and Laſting, yet it would be Scandalous and Dangerous. They did therefore exclaim againſt it, and let any one judge whether the Event has not ſufficiently juſtify'd that Conduct of theirs, tho' his Grace is pleas'd to write to the General of the common Enemy that they had no Colour for it.

The Confederates had ſuch a Jealouſy of the Lord *Strafford*, that none of their Generals viſited him while he was in the Duke of *Ormond*'s Camp, except the *Hanover* General *Beclau*: He notify'd his Arrival to the Prince of *Savoy* and the *Dutch* Field Deputies, who contented themſelves with returning the Compliment. Indeed the Allies had ſo good Grounds to think the *Engliſh* Troops would rather join with the *French* than with theirs, that I was not ſurpriz'd to find the *Dutch* ſhould order the Gates of the Towns in *Flanders* in their Poſſeſſion to be ſhut againſt them when the Duke of *Ormond* left the Confederates, and compleated a Ceſſation of Arms the 18th of *July*, a few Days before the Butchery at *Denain*. What Reaſon have we to ſuppoſe, the Duke of *Ormond* would not have done by *Bouchain*, *Doway*, and the other Towns in the *Netherlands*, as he did by *Ghent* and *Bruges*, which have never ſince he ſet Foot in them been in the Power of the *Dutch*, and of all the Men in the World, I ſhould have ſhut out the Lord *Strafford* from every ſtrong Town, had I been a *German* or *Dutchman*. That new Earl having from the very beginning of the Treaty at *Utrecht*, ſhewn a great Negligence for the Intereſts of the Allies, not to ſay a great Zeal for thoſe of *France*. And I have read in an Author, who wrote of that Treaty, that the Earl of *Strafford* went

went *Incognito* to the *French* Camp to conſer with the Mareſchal *de Villars*; and he ſays, *it was reported, that 'twas there agreed among other things, that the* Engliſh *ſhould make themſelves Maſters of* Ghent *and* Bruges. The Author of the Conduct would on the contrary make us believe, that the Duke who had given out that he would take the *Route* of *Ypres*, chang'd his Mind, and march'd away to *Ghent* for fear the *Imperialiſts* and *Dutch* ſhould Seize about a Thouſand Men in Garriſon in the Town and Cittadel of *Ghent*, *to provide as well for the Security of the Troops he had with him, as of thoſe in the Town and Cittadel of* Ghent. Thus we ſee it was by no means to ſecure the Command of the Rivers *Liſs* and *Schelde*, to ſtreighten the Armies of the Allies, by rendering the paſſage of thoſe Rivers precarious to them, and at his Grace's Pleaſure, which it did effectually, and put a ſtop to the Progreſs of their Arms, as much as the Slaughter at *Denain*. Some have thought that the Duke's taking Poſſeſſion of thoſe two Towns, did the *French* as much Service as if he had join'd their Army; for how could they have employ'd 10, or perhaps 20000 Men better, and the Duke had not above 12000 with him.

Though there is a long Memorial from Prince *Eugene* and the *Dutch* Deputies, to excuſe and diſown the Behaviour of the Governours of the Towns in *Flanders*, who ſhut their Gates againſt the *Britiſh* Troops; yet it is not to be doubted, but theſe Governours had very good Reaſons for what they did, and that the Excuſes which were made for them were *Grimace*: It being neceſſary to give good Words to a Miniſtry, that upon all Occaſions did their utmoſt to exaſperate the two Nations of *England* and *Holland*, and engage them in a quarrel that *France* might make a Prey of both of them. I do not think it worth while to inquire into the Circumſtances of the Treatment of the *Iriſh* Captain, the Duke ſent an Expreſs to *England*, met with from his Guides, a ſmall Matter to complain of, when he had two Plenipotentiaries at *Utrecht*, that were dealing as they did by all our Confederates. Was it thus that the Duke of *Marlborough* us'd to be receiv'd in his Marches? Did the Cities of *Holland*, *Flanders*, or *Germany*, ſhut their Gates againſt him? How comes it that there is every where a Diffidence of the *Engliſh*,

liſh, a Nation the moſt bleſs'd, the moſt honour'd, and the moſt belov'd of all the Nations in *Europe*, 'till the fatal Change of their Councellors. Their Miniſters and Generals, they were now become ſo odious, that poor Captain *Hart* could not get Horſes at *Bruges* to carry him on his Journey, a good Reaſon for ſecuring ſo unhoſpitable a City. The Magiſtrates had ſuch an Opinion of our Army of *Deſerters*, that my Author ſays they apply'd to the Council of State, to know how they ſhould behave themſelves againſt their Enemies the *Engliſh*, the Citizens of *Ghent* alſo ſent Deputies on the ſame Errand. Where then was the Honour of the Nation, or the Reputation of the General? Are we become a Terror to thoſe that courted and careſt us a few Months before? Is this the Effect of ſhifting of Hands? What Argument can vindicate ſuch Conduct, where the Fact ſpeaks it ſelf ſo ſhamefully as the Hiſtory of the Campaigne of 1712.

The Writer of the *Conduct* tells us, that the Duke of *Ormond* had advice by Colonel *King* in his Camp at *Fleurus*, that the Queen's Troops were entirely in Poſſeſſion of *Dunkirk*, and the Forts belonging to it; rare News, and how quick it came to his Grace's Camp; while we in *England* were fond to ſtay for it, write, and Clamour for it many Months, and 'tis queſtion'd whether we had it right at laſt. About the ſame time that Colonel *King* brings this comfortable News to the Duke's Camp that we were ſole Maſters of *Dunkirk*, came other News to *England*, as that *not only the Civil Government remain'd ſtill in the Hands of the* French, *and ſtill their Ships and Gallies were permitted to remain in the Harbour, with two or three Batallions of Marines in the Town on pretence of guarding the Stores; but the Privateers of the Place were indulg'd the Liberty of going in and out, provided they brought no* Engliſh *Prizes into their Port.* And it is certain we were never ſo much in Poſſeſſion of it, but the *French* might have diſpoſſeſt us in four and twenty Hours time. It was the Cuſtom of the late Managers to affirm boldly, and it matters not whether what they ſaid was agreeable to Truth, or even to Probability. If the Faction could do their Buſineſs by a Falſity this Minute, they had another for the next, and ſo *ad infinitum*. The Author of this Conduct imitates ſometimes the

the Author of the Conduct of the Allies in his Veracity and Sincerity, but I muſt tell the Colonel he is anſwerable for his News, and there I ſhall leave it.

That it might not appear ſo ſtrange as otherwiſe it would, to put the Flemings in ſuch an ill Humour with the *Engliſh*; we muſt obſerve, that Sir *Thomas Hanmer* having been at *Oſtend*, and cauſing the Depth of the Harbour to be ſounded, as alſo viewing the Fortifications with the Burgomaſter *Bawens*, who was ſuppos'd to be in the *Britiſh* Intereſt, gave a Jealouſy that we had a Deſign upon the place, whether groundleſs or not I ſhall not enquire; but this I muſt needs ſay that our Affairs were in ſuch Hands as might well render us ſuſpected by every one that wiſh'd well to the Liberties of *Europe*.

We were told two or three Pages ago, that the Magiſtrates of *Bruges* were for making a Defence againſt *their Enemies the* Engliſh; and now we are inform'd that Brigadier *Sutton* being arriv'd there, *ſent the Duke an Account how well diſpos'd he found the Magiſtrates of the Town to do any thing his Grace ſhould deſire*; and truly it was their wiſeſt way when he was Maſter of the Town, and the *French* had been Maſſacring the Allies, while the *Engliſh* Troops were providing themſelves ſafe Quarters in a plentiful Country.

The leaving the Confederate Army at the Mercy of the common Enemy, the depriving them of the Facility of Supplies by poſſeſſing *Ghent* and *Bruges*, was ſo very acceptable to the then Miniſters, that *Bolingbroke* writes to the Duke in his Letter of the 11th of *July* 1712, which ſure cannot be call'd the Campagne of 1712. The *Britiſh* Troops being at Heart's Eaſe in good Quarters, *That he is particularly directed by the Queen*, to begin his *diſpatch by acquainting his Grace that no Service could be more agreeable to Her than that, which he has done Her and his Country.* Hold a little Mr. *Secretary*, how is the Country ſerv'd in all this? What Advantages has it got in Trade? What Securities for its Religion and Liberty? What Hopes of a laſting Peace founded on Treachery and Infamy? Let us know one Benefit to us by the Conduct of the Miniſters that procur'd the Orders, which his Grace obey'd, except it be the Bleſſing us with their Miniſtry, and I will give

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up this Cauſe for ever, and never mention one of the Thouſand Miſchiefs that this Peace has and may bring upon us. But their ſtile was ſometimes the *Church*, ſometimes the Country, for of all Men they had been the moſt impudent, if they had ever preſum'd to have mention'd themſelves, Vaſſals in *Preamble* and *Inſtructions*. The Secretary proceeds, *She thanks you for it, and will never forget the exact Obedience which you have paid to Her Orders; nor the admirable Patience and temper which you have ſhewn in ſo uneaſie a ſituation.* This is right. His Graces Patience and Temper in bearing ſo many Affronts from the Miniſters, who ſent him Orders ſo derogatory to his Honour, was very extraordinary; Inſomuch that his Grace the Duke of *Devonſhire*, who is his Relation, took notice in the Houſe of Lords of their uſing a Perſon of his High Birth, ſo ill as to ſend him on ſo inglorious an Errand. *Let the Conſequences of it be what it will, the blame*, ſays the Viſcount, *can never be laid upon Her Majeſty.* But I hope it may and I believe it will be laid upon his Lordſhip as the main Adviſer and Manager of ſo Ruinous a Treaty. Again *Her Majeſty will ſupport what ſhe has undertaken*; and wonderful is the Piety and Charity of this Excellent Secretary, *I pray God the Allies do not find reaſon to repent their raſh Counſels, and inflexible obſtinacy*, in not giving up all their hopes and pretenſions to the baſe Intereſt of a Proud, Rapacious Factions, Uſurping the Name and Authority of the Queen.

In the ſame *Diſpatch* ſpeaking of the Dukes withdrawing, *Time*, ſays he, *might produce ſome difficulty, and in our preſent Circumſtances as little as poſſible ſhou'd be left to hazard.* Does he not here plainly refer to the Diviſions and Diſtractions the New *Managers* had occaſion'd both at *home* and *abroad* which ſhou'd oblige them to make ſure of every thing? The Ground they trod upon was extreamly ſlippery, and a Fall was irrecoverable. How comes it the *Court-Circumſtances* are of a ſudden become ſo *difficult*? that we who in conjunction with the *Dutch*, under the Denomination of the *Maritime Powers* gave *Laws* to all the *Nations* we had to do with. How comes it, I ſay, that without loſing a *Battle*, or a ſingle *Town*, and even in the midſt of *Victory* we are reduc'd to ſuch perilous ſtraights! Why we are no more under the ſame *Management* we have loſt our *General*, we have

have loſt our *Councellors*, we have loſt our *Friends*, and have loſt our *Credit*. We are grown contemptible to our very vanquiſh'd *Enemies*; all the *Confederates* are juſtly exaſperated by our imperious and unjuſtifiable Behaviour. They know who were the occaſion of this fatal *Change*, and wou'd be ready at any time to contribute all that lay in their power to bring the Offenders to *Juſtice*, therefore nothing muſt be ventur'd for fear it ſhou'd hinder the *Peace*, the only thing that cou'd ſave them.

Inſtead of confering with the *Miniſters* and *Generals* of the *Allies*, as moſt certainly it was the duty of the *Britiſh General* to have done when he was to break up and leave them that they might make the neceſſary proviſion for their Defence, and taken their Meaſures for the more ſucceſsful Operations of the *Campagne*; the Duke is order'd by his worthy *Secretary* to *communicate his Deſign to* Monſieur Villars *to concert with him whatever might be neceſſary*, &c. And that is the conſequence of this Communication, and this Deſertion which they call *withdrawing*. *This Morning an Account came from* Bruſſels *of the intire Defeat of the Body of Troops commanded by the Lord of* Albemarle *at* Denain. The Author gives us no Comment on this Event, we have the plain Fact only, but *Abel* and the Faction in *England* were not content with the Narration, they took hold of a lucky Incident to rally Prince *Eugene*, and make a Jeſt of the Maſſacre of ſo many Thouſand brave Men who had been fighting for us Ten Years.

Prince *Eugene*, ſays *Roper*, *was not aware of the Enemies coming but was dup'd by the* Mareſchal de Villars, *and ſeeing his advancing farther cou'd be of no good conſequence, he wiſely kept out of harms way, the occaſion of that ſudden Rout of our Troops is attributed to the Enemies attacking a place of the Retrenchments which was guarded by four Regiments of Mercenaries.* He was order'd to reflect thus upon them, for that they would not betray the *Common Cauſe* as thoſe Soldiers did that march'd off with the Duke of *Ormond*. What Troops were there in either Army that ſerv'd without Pay, and what Men deſerve it better than Soldiers? He proceeds, *Whether or no theſe Fellows thought themſelves bound always to deſert their Cauſe, or whatever was the matter 'tis certain they threw down their Arms in very good time, and betook themſelves to their*

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Heels, their Flight gave the Enemy leave to enter the Retrenchments, and though the reſt of our Troops conſiſting of Eleven Batallions, put themſelves upon their Defence, they were over-power'd by the multitude of the French, *and forc'd to run for their Lives.* What pleaſure this *Villain* takes in exaggerating the Loſs of the Confederates at that time owing intirely to the Deſertion of the *Britiſh* Army? There were ſome *Britiſh* Troops at *Denain*, but the Duke of *Ormond* had *withdrawn* them thence, and *Villars* had no ſooner notice of his having left the Camp of the Allies than he meditated the Project of falling upon their Detachment at *Denain. But Alas, continues* Abel, *what is the Misfortune of that Day compar'd with its dire Conſequence! The* Mareſchal de Villars *having thus outwitted the renown'd* Eugene, *has ſince poſſeſt himſelf*, &c. Here he enumerates the *Towns* and *Villages* about which theſe unfortunate Troops were Encamp'd, and which being open, defenceleſs, became an eaſy Prey to the Conquerour, with all the Stores that were in them. The *Mareſchal de Villars* did not fail to Complement the Duke on his *Victory* at *Denain*, where with 30000 Bold *Frenchmen*, ſpirited by the Duke's leaving our Friends, he beat 10000 *Dutch* and *Germans.*

The Enemy has been made ſenſible, ſays the Mareſchal, *that the departure of the brave* Engliſh *was not at all for them, ſince the Queens Troops no ſooner left the Allies than this Misfortune happen'd to them.* He acknowledges his Glorious Succeſſes to be owing to the Duke's Conduct, and what the Allies and we our ſelves are indebted to it ſince it ſo apparently facilitated the concluſion of the *Peace*, I leave to the Readers to determine. If it be ſaid that in all thoſe Caſes his Grace acted in obedience to the *Letter of his Orders*, tho' I do not ſee how ſuch *Orders can always juſtifie a Subject in obedience*, I cannot obſerve that the Duke was not ſo bound as ſome repreſent him, that he was in ſome things a free Agent, which is ſufficient to prove that he did not act againſt Choice, but was very well pleas'd with the Meaſures taken by the Miniſters, the Viſcount *Bolingbroke* in his Diſpatch of the 10th of *July* declared as much; and that the *Queen was unwilling to reſtrain his Grace by particular and poſitive Inſtructions, who made uſe of the Diſcretionary Powers given him, ſo much to Her Honour, and the Good of Her Subjects.* If the Viſcount cou'd

prove

prove that it was for Her Honour to break Her Treaties, and abandon Her Confederates. And for the good of Her Subjects to Sacrifice their Trade and Security in a bad Peace, then this wou'd not be Flattery. The ſeiſing of *Ghent* was the reaſon of this Panegyrick, and on what account he made it, we may ſee by his telling the Duke that the ſecuring that wou'd bring the *Dutch and Imperialiſts to a more decent way of Behaviour.* Our *Miniſters* were intirely Maſters of the *French* Cant, to put the Court in Mind of their Engagements was *Indecent*, to deſire them to take care of the *common Cauſe*, and provide for the Intereſts of all the *Allies* in the Treaty of Peace, *was wreſting it out of the Queen's Hands.* Who put this project of ſeizing *Ghent* and *Bruges* into the late Managers Heads, appears by a Letter of the Marquis *de Torcy* to the Viſcount *Bolingbroke*, ſetting forth the great Uſe that might be made of *thoſe two Towns to give Law to the* Dutch; and *Bolingbroke* in his Diſpatch to the Duke, ſpeaking of this ſtep, lets us into a Secret which the Faction us'd to deny with the moſt terrible Oaths and Execrations, that they had a Scheme of joining the *Britiſh* Forces to the *French*, and falling upon the Confederates to force them to a Peace at Diſcretion. *It is the Intereſt of the* French, ſays the Viſcount, *and there are perhaps ſome of Her Majeſty's Subjects, ſo unhappy as to think it theirs too, that the Queen ſhould join Her Forces with thoſe of* France; but he aſſures us, Her Majeſty would not hearken to it, being reſolv'd *to be equally juſt and equally firm to all Parties, towards Friends as well as Enemies.* We muſt remember that he tells us this at the ſame time, that he rejoyces with the Duke for his taking Poſſeſſion of two Towns that did not belong to us, and that on purpoſe to ſtrengthen the *Confederates*, by rendering their Communication with *Holland* difficult: *was this to be juſt?* And was treating at the ſame time with the *French* and the *Allies*, *to be firm?* This Secretary of ours could not write a Line without ſome daring Invaſion upon Truth and common Senſe: He adds, Her Majeſty *could not think of joyning Her Troops with the* French *to diſtreſs the Confederates, how great ſoever the Provocation ſhe had receiv'd from thoſe might have been*; but Her *Miniſters* and *Favourites* could think of poſting 12 or 15000 Men in the way of the *Dutch*

Convoys and Supplies, and rendering thereby the latter Precarious. What could more *Diſtreſs* the *Allies*? And what be of more Service to the *French*? The Provocation here talkt of is a diſlike of Her *Managers*, and faithful Repreſentation of the Treaſury and Errors of their *Management*. : *She is willing to hope*, he adds, *that at laſt they will concur with Her Majeſty, from whom they could not ſeparate but to their Diſadvantage.* The Duke of *Ormond* has carry'd off their beſt Troops, has poſted them in two Towns, which makes them almoſt as uneaſy as if the *French* were there, and yet the honeſt Viſcount charges the Confederates with *ſeparating* from the Queen.

The Marquis *de Torcy* was not the only *French* Miniſter that would have perſwaded our Court to order the Duke of *Ormond* to join the *French*, and orders warrant any thing; the Mareſchal *de Villars* wrote *much in the ſame Strain to his Grace*, pag. 55. and the Duke tells the Viſcount, that their not doing it *would be a powerful Argument to induce the Confederates, to concur with Her Majeſty in the Meaſures ſhe was taking for their good.* 'Twas much for their good to give *Spain* to the Houſe of *Bourbon*, to give back *Liſle*, and all their beſt Conqueſts to the *French* King, to leave the *Dutch* and *Germans*, as weak a *Barrier* as they had before the *War*: In a word, not to get one Article of Importance in favour of the *Confederates*, but to dictate to them *en maitre*. The Stile of the late Miniſters and their Inſtruments either means nothing at all, or is the quite contrary to what they pretend, and ſhould be read backwards as *Witches* ſays their *Prayers*. When they talk of the Queen's *Honour*, they intend only their own, which was inconſiſtent with Her Majeſty's, the Employment of ſuch People being the greateſt Blemiſh of Her Reign; when they ſpeak of the *Good* of their *Country*, they mean the preſerving their *Poſts*; and the *good of the Allies*, which his Grace ſays the Queen was doing them, was dividing them by raiſing *Jealouſies*, and by that means giving *France* an opportunity to put what End ſhe pleas'd to the War.

The next Letter from the Secretary is full of Tranſport, at the Thoughts of the *Duke's taking hold of* Ghent *and* Bruges, which he ſays will have a due Effect on the Conduct of the *Allies*, ſtill in the ſame Tone. 'Twill bring the Confederates to a Neceſſity

Neceſſity of coming *into the Queen's Peace*; what a Peace that was, and what good it has done us, and our Confederates, all *Europe* is appriz'd of.

Let not any one imagine, that the *Holſteiners* and *Liegois* who deſerted the Confederates with the Duke of *Ormond*, did it out of a Senſe of their Duty in obeying the Orders of the Prince that paid them. The *Holſteiners* were influenc'd by *Money* and *Swediſh* Counſels, the Men of *Liege* by *Money* and *French* Counſels, they were brib'd to do what they did, and were to have not only their Pay, but an extraordinary Reward, as we find in the laſt Diſpatch of the Viſcount's; *You may depend upon it, that the Encouragement which you gave to the Holſteiners, and to the Dragoons ſhall be made good to them*, pag. 56. thus did our *Money* fly about to corrupt the *Generals* and *Soldiers* of the *Army* we had deſerted, and leave them as weak and defenceleſs as we could. For though Her Majeſty had been pleas'd to declare our *Intereſt*, and that of the *Dutch* to be *inſeparable*; yet 'tis now the quite contrary, and by the Proceedings of Her Miniſters, one would think that our *Intereſt* and that of *France* was ſo. There had it ſeems been a talk in *Holland*, that the *Managers* in *England* could not hold it. The *Dutch* did not think of the Expedient of making *Lords* by *Dozens*. This News came to the Ears of the Mareſchal *de Villars*, and the Author of the Conduct has with great ſimplicity of Heart told us, that the Mareſchal immediately writes the Duke word what he had heard. *They talk in* Holland, ſays the *French* General to the *Britiſh* one, *in a very ſingular manner, of a Revolution ready to happen in* England; and to widen the Breach between us and our Allies, he informs him further, *That the Animoſity among the Confederates was as great againſt* England *as againſt* France. This did not ſatisfy the Mareſchal, he Diſpatches another Letter to the Duke on the ſame Subject, tells him that General *Hompeſh* had ſaid there would be a *Revolution* in *England*, and in ſurprizing Confidence aſſures his Grace, *That there was no good* Frenchman *but ought to dread it.* The *Author* of the *Conduct* owns this Letter, and this Expreſſion in it to be receiv'd by the Duke from ſo *good a Frenchman* as Monſieur *de Villars*. Now, what do we in *England* underſtand by a *good Frenchman*, but an *Enemy* to our *Country*, our *Religion* and *Conſtitution*, a *bloody Perſecutor*, or

abject Slave. Thus we ſee that all the Enemies of *Proteſtantiſm* and *Liberty* dreaded to have the *Miniſtry* in any other Hands than the laſt. O my Conſcience, if I had ſuch a Letter by me, and had any the leaſt Reſpect for ever a one of the late *Managers*, I would have ſuppreſt it! I would never have let it be known, that the Mareſchal *de Villars* wrote to the Duke of *Ormond*, that the *French* were in a terrible Fright leaſt the *late Miniſters* ſhould loſe their *Places*; but I am in ſuch a Diſpoſition with reſpect to thoſe Miniſters, that I thank him heartily for communicating ſo valuable a Secret, which will a little feed our Impatience, 'till we are acquainted with the Diſcoveries that are now making. The Duke, as the Author tells us, *gave no Attention* to the Mareſchal's News, by which one may ſuppoſe, that the Secretary did not keep things ſo much from him as has been imagin'd, however he ſent *Bolingbroke* advice of it. The *Conduct*, with a Sincerity equal to that above-mention'd, informs us, that Prince *Eugene* was afraid of truſting the Duke of *Ormond* even with the Camp News; *he has expreſly forbid the Directors of the Poſt to ſend his Grace the leaſt Intelligence of what paſt in his Army.* A comfortable Reflection for an *Engliſh General* to have behav'd himſelf ſo in a *Confederate* Army, that none but the *Enemy* would truſt him.

We are come now to a piece of *Eloquence*, which has charm'd every body that has ſeen it, I mean the *Encomium* of that very Noble Perſon the *Quondam Treaſurer* upon the Duke of *Ormond*; a Letter of the fifth of *Auguſt*, all at length. Sure his Grace or the Author muſt be extreamly in love with the ſtile, or elſe this *Epiſtle* wou'd not have been Printed, for I'm ſatisfy'd they could not have a thought that a good word from the Writer would be of any ſervice to a Man's Character. The Double Earl begins with Congratulating as well as he could, the Duke of *Ormond on his great Succeſſes*; by this one wou'd have imagin'd that his Grace was Encampt under the Walls of *Paris*, and the Campagne of *Ghent* had been as Glorious as that of *Ramelies*. This notable Peer has it over and over again, *what pleaſure he took, what great ſatisfaction, what a double pleaſure* in his Grace's *Succeſs*. Which inſtead of uſing a Galliciſm to call it a *Coup de Maitre*, and was done to ſhew his *Breeding*, he ſhould have extolled in *Arabick*, to ſhew his *Learning*; and the fewer that had underſtood

ſtood him the leſs he and Dear his Friend had been laugh'd at. There is a word at the bottom which will never be taken in a good ſenſe for the ſake of the Earl that uſes it, I mean *Attachments*, it being the very word he made uſe of when he wrote to his Royal Highneſs the Prince of *Wales*, after he and his Accomplices had refuſed the Prince his Right of a *Writ* to take his *Seat* in *Parliament*. He boaſts in that Letter of his *Attachment* to the Houſe of *Hanover*, and in this of his *Attachment* to the Duke of *Ormond*, and how far ſuch a Complement ought to have Credit, I need not intimate, his Lordſhip is ſo well known to all Ranks and Degrees.

The next Letter his Grace has from the Secretary is dated at *Dunkirk*, of which he aſſures him, *we were perfectly Maſters*; who would not take ſuch a Man's Word? He does not write this to *Brinſly*, Mr. *Chack*, or any Perſon whom he might be free with, and banter them, and play upon 'em, as he thought fitteſt to a Man of high Quality at the Head of an Army, ſuch a one as it was, and he tells him we were *perfect Maſters of Dunkirk* in *Auguſt* 1712! A Man that has ſuch a *Talent* as that is, need not fear making his Fortune in any Place where a *Forehead* is uſeful. And a good *aſſurance* is a great encommendation than a good *Conſcience*, and a *good Capacity*. I will not ſpeak to this, it is too hard an impoſition to admit of Remark.

In the ſame *Pag.* 59. we are told of a reaſon to juſtifie the Duke's Conduct about *Bruges* and *Ghent*, which I never heard of before, which is that he poſſeſt himſelf of thoſe Places to prevent their falling into the Hands of the *French*. Their ſafety, his Grace ſays, *depended upon it, ſince if the Duke had not firſt taken poſſeſſion of Ghent, the French would certainly have made themſelves Maſters of it after the Defeat of Deuzin*; but the Place being now in the Hands of thoſe that by *withdrawing* or *deſerting* the *Confederates* had given the *French* the advantage, and occaſion'd the *Defeat* and Butchery of the Troops of the *Allies*; the latter muſt doubtleſs be highly content to hear the Duke of *Ormond* had poſſeſt himſelf of it. The Duke owns that *Ghent intercepted all the Convoys from Holland*, and what dependance the Confederates could have on thoſe Convoys after he had left them, and ſeis'd that Town, one may doubt without conſidering much of the matter after the ſteps taken by the *Britiſh General*. Had Prince

Eugene

Eugene been in a capacity to act offensively after the Rout at *Denain*, one may very well question whether he would have continu'd the Siege of *Landrecy*, or ventur'd to have march'd farther, when a *General* who had left him at the *Mercy* of the *Enemy*, who was Master of the *River*, by which all his Provisions and Stores were to come to him. And here's the great Service we did the *French* by seising *Ghent*. We had no longer the least Credit among the *Allies*. They durst not trust to our Friendship to let their Convoys pass, and therefore were oblig'd to retire towards *Mons* for the convenience of Supplies from *Brussels*.

In the next Dispatch from the Viscount the old Claim is reviv'd, for which neither himself nor any of his Brother *Ministers* were in effect the least concern'd, farther than it made a Noise, and serv'd to put a Slur on the *Barrier* Treaty, in which the *Guaranty* of the *Protestant Succession* was included. *The Queen hath receiv'd so much ill usage with respect to the Commerce of her Subjects in the* Netherlands, *and hath so much reason to expect more of the same kind, that she is resolv'd to treat upon that Head with those Pawns in Her Hand.* The *Trade* was on the same foot as ever, and besides can one imagin those Men were in any manner of pain about our *Flemish Trade*, when they were bargaining with *France* for our *Spanish* and *French*. No! No! The taking and keeping *Ghent* and *Bruges* was design'd to force the *Allies* to come into the *Queen's Peace*, and help'd it forward more effectually than any one *Advantage* the *French* got of the *Confederates*, after the *Command* of their *Army* was taken from the Duke of *Marlborough*.

We have seen what mortal Terror that good *Frenchman* Monsieur *de Villars* was in, on a Report, that there was like to be a *Change* in *England*. To remove which, the *Secretary* writes to the *General*, that the *Dutch* should be School'd for suffering such Reports, *They shall be made sensible that Her Majesty is not ignorant of it, and my Lord* Strafford *will take an Opportunity to drop something of this kind.* My Lord's way of *dropping* things was like Captain *Haskums* in the *Comedy*, or *Drawcansir* in the *Rehearsal*; he *dropt* this expression with *Thunder* and *Lightning*, and no question his *droppings* put the *Pensionary* in almost as great a Pannick as the *Mareschal de Villars* had been in for fear of loosing the late Ministry.

What

What I am next to take notice of, is agreeable to all the reſt, and a ſtep which will hardly be believ'd by Poſterity to be taken by an *Engliſhman*. The *Dutch* had form'd a Deſign to ſurprize *Newport* or *Furnes*, upon which the Duke of *Ormond* writes immediately away to the *Secretary*, *That he is humbly of Opinion ſome means ſhould be found out to give advice of it to the Mareſchal de Villars*. And why are the *Allies* to be betray'd in ſo flagrant a manner? Becauſe he tells us the *French General* had given us ſeveral Intelligences, with a *Deſign to ſerve Her Majeſty and the Nation*. This the Duke of *Ormond* writes to the Viſcount *Bolingbroke*, and what uſe was made of our knowledge of the intended Enterprize upon *Newport*, one may gueſs by its coming to nothing. Is there a *Duke*, or indeed any Body in *Great Britain* who can believe that the *Mareſchal de Villars* had ever a Deſign in his Head to ſerve Queen *Anne* and the People of *England*? but Love makes folks blind, and we were grown ſo fond of our *New French Friends*, that we could not diſtinguiſh *Flattery* and *Knavery* from *Honeſty* and *Friendſhip*. Happy *Britains* to have your Counſels and your Armies under ſuch Conduct!

Whatever Veneration the *Britains* might have had for the Name of *Ormond* in King *William*'s, and the Beginning of Queen *Anne*'s Reign, it muſt ſurely ſink, when they hear it on all occaſions trumpetted about by the Riotous *Rabble*, and that without giving the leaſt offence in appearance to the Perſon who is in Duty and Honour oblig'd to ſilence 'em as much as lies in his power, and they would ſoon be ſilent if they were not paid for *Uproar*. This will raiſe the indignation of all Loyal Subjects; and with ſuch Sentiments; 'tis probable ſome hard Expreſſions may have eſcapt me, but ſure not ſo hard as the occaſion requires, and that I may not be tempted to ſuit my Language to my Subject, I ſhall content my ſelf with theſe Reflections on the Facts, as they naturally riſe from the Matter which the *Author* of the *Conduct* has furniſhed me with. Upon his Graces taking upon him that very Command which the Duke of *Marlborough* had deſerv'd by ſo many *Victories*, and ſo much *Glory*; Mr. *Maynwaring* in a Treatiſe called the *French Kings promiſe to the Pretender*, writes thus:

Whatever Hands are employ'd, if a good Peace be not made, or the War carry'd on, we ſhall not long be a free People. It would be

fooliſh

fooliſh therefore at this time to complain of any extraordinary Favours ſhewn to the new General; if the Publick has been at greater Expence to fit him out for this Campagne *than was ever allow'd before, which I am afraid is the Caſe, and we could expect no Advantage by the Change, but what we were to hope for from the different Abilities of the new Commander: Yet we ought not at this time to think of that, but to wiſh he were at Liberty to equal the Succeſs of his Predeceſſor.*

What invidious Accounts of the Profits of the *Generalſhip*, did the then prevailing *Faction* order their *Libellers*, ſuch as *Swift*, *Foe*, *Oldſworth*, *Roper*, &c. to publiſh on purpoſe to ſhew what we ſhould get by having our Armies entruſted with a Perſon of ſo much *Diſintereſt* as the *New General?* but here we ſee, that the Nation had been at greater Expence to fit him out for the *Campagne of* 1712, the wonders of which we have been relating, than they were at to fit out the old General for the *Campagne* of *Blenheim* and *Ramelies*. Mr. *Maynwaring* aſſerts this to be true, and I can aſſure the Reader, that he knew as much of the matter as any one: He informs us that, "the Scituation of the two "Armies were exactly as it is deſcrib'd in the Plan hereunto "prefixt. The Plain that leads to the *Source of the Schelde* is near "Three Leagues broad; and the Allies might eaſily have gain'd "it in one March, their Camp being only Four ſhort Leagues "from that of the *French*, and the Country ſo open as to admit "of Marching in as many Columns as they pleas'd.

"Monſieur *Villars* had left near Forty Battallions of thoſe For-"ces that were deſign'd for his Army in *Valencienne*, *Queſnoy*, "*Landrecy* and *Maubeuge*; ſo that the Superiority on our ſide "was very great, and is computed to have been at leaſt Thirty "Thouſand Men.

"The Number therefore of our Troops exceeding thoſe of "of the Enemy, and the Ground to attack the Flank of their "Right Wing, being very favourable, in caſe they paſs'd be-"tween the *Bohain*, and the *Source of the Schelde*, Prince *Eugene* "of *Savoy* and the Deputies of the States propos'd marching di-"rectly to them: But the Duke of *Ormond* refus'd it, ſaying, *He* "*waited for Letters from beyond Sea, before he could conſent to a Bat-*"*tle, or furniſh any Troops for a Troops*; And thus an Opportuni-"ty was irrecoverably Loſt of deſtroying the *French* Army, as "Prince *Eugene* himſelf acquainted the States General.

F I N I S.